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Leadership and Organizational Culture Transformation in Professional Sport 
 
Joe Frontiera, M.S. 
 
 
Schein (1992) defined organizational culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the 
group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration” (p. 12), 
and organizational culture has long been recognized as a moderator to performance in business 
(Baalthazard, Cooke, & Potter, 2006; Kotter & Heskett, 1992; Smerek & Denison, 2007). The 
purpose of this qualitative study was to examine the phenomena of organizational culture change 
in professional sport (National Basketball Association, Major League Baseball, and National 
Football League). Of the 32 teams that met criteria for inclusion, six agreed to participate. 
Specifically, leaders (owners or general managers) who had successfully brought their 
organizations through organizational culture change, as evidenced by their team’s performance, 
agreed to an in-person interview.  Modified interpretive analysis was utilized to analyze the data 
(Hatch, 2002), from which five primary themes emerged (Symptoms of a Dysfunctional Culture, 
My Way, Walk the Talk, Embedding New Culture, and Our Way). These themes and their 
respective subthemes were highly inter-related and together formed an initial model for 
organizational culture change in professional sport: the Culture Change Cycle. Each theme along 
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Williams and Straub (2001) suggest that sport psychology developed largely from the 
fields of physical education and exercise science. However, Coleman Griffith, widely considered 
the “grandfather” of North American sport psychology, was a psychologist by training 
(Zaichkowsky & Naylor, 2005). Other pioneers in the field, such as Bruce Ogilve and Tom 
Tutko, were also trained psychologists. Through these individuals and others like them, sport 
psychology has borrowed significant theory from social and industrial-organizational psychology 
on a variety of subjects ranging from personality to group dynamics and leadership.   
More specifically, applied sport psychology is defined as “identifying and understanding 
psychological theories and techniques that can be applied to sport and exercise to enhance the 
performance and personal growth of athletes” (p. 1; Williams & Straub, 2001). With such a 
broad definition, it is surprising that practitioners in the field beleaguer the fact that there is a 
limited market for sport psychology services, and that so few sport and exercise psychology 
professionals can make a living consulting on a full time basis (Meyers, Coleman, Whelan, & 
Mehlenbeck, 2001). Most professionals in the field have taken a physiological or cognitive-
behavioral approach to the application of their discipline, and focus primarily on working 
directly with individual athletes, teams and coaches. However, more recently, the field of 
“performance psychology”, a hybrid of sport psychology, organizational consulting, and 
performing arts psychology, has emerged (Hays, 2006). The term typically refers to the 
psychology of excellent performance. Performance psychology has the potential for a more 
widespread application both within the realm of sport and in other disciplines in which high 
“performance” is required. 
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In further exploring performance psychology’s application, it would be appropriate to 
examine the possibilities for performance enhancement in sport organizations outside of the 
context of developing specific mental skills. There are many avenues to pursue this goal, some of 
which lead back to the roots of traditional sport psychology and integration of industrial-
organizational psychology concepts.  Specifically, organizational culture has long been 
recognized as a moderator to performance in business (Baalthazard, Cooke, & Potter, 2006; 
Kotter & Heskett, 1992; Smerek & Denison, 2007) and warrants further exploration as a possible 
lever for performance improvement in professional sport organizations. To better comprehend 
this potential impact it is necessary to understand both of the archetypal definitions of 
organizational culture as well as the multiple approaches to cultural research. 
Organizational Culture & Performance 
Organizational culture, in laymen’s terms, is often described as “the way we do things 
around here” or the values that hold an organization together, yet academic researchers have 
struggled to find consensus on a precise definition of culture. Ideational definitions emphasize 
cognitive aspects of culture, such as ‘meanings’ and ‘understandings’ (Martin, 2002). For 
example, Louis (1985) defined culture as a set of “meanings shared by a group of people” (p. 
74). Researchers relying on an ideational approach, for example, would examine the meaning 
organizational members attribute to common myths or stories within the organization. Other 
definitions of culture are primarily materialistic, and focus on the material manifestation of 
ideations. Mills (1988) suggested that culture is the “manifestations of a process of ideational 
development located within a context of definite material conditions” (p. 366). A researcher 
relying on the materialistic approach would examine dress, workplace environment, hierarchy, 
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and job descriptions. Subjectively, the researcher must determine what each materialistic item 
means.  
Along with multiple approaches to defining culture, there are diverse methods to 
approaching cultural research: integration, differentiation, and fragmentation (Meyerson & 
Martin, 1987). Studies from the integration perspective assume that all members in an 
organization share one consensus of culture, and there is clarity surrounding this consensus.  In 
contrast, research grounded in the differentiation approach suggests that elements of culture can 
be inconsistent. Although consensus of meaning may exist with smaller subgroups of an 
organization, agreement may not exist across subgroups or throughout the entire organization. 
Furthermore, there may be ambiguities within the smaller groups, as evidenced by leaders who 
say one thing and do the exact opposite. Finally, the fragmentation approach takes differentiation 
one step further to suggest that ambiguity is the ‘essence’ of organizational culture. Consensus 
depends wholly upon the issue in question and can never exist across an organization (Martin, 
1992). 
Schein (1992) provides a definition of organizational culture that integrates both the 
ideational and materialist components of culture and is general enough in its wording to allow 
for elements of differentiation: 
A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well 
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as 
the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to these problems. (p. 12)  
Schein (1990, 1992) goes on to define the three levels of organizational culture: artifacts, values 
and underlying assumptions.  The first, or outer, level is composed of the artifacts that an 
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organization makes public: for example, a vision statement, company slogan, statues, or even the 
way cubicles are arranged can provide indications of the deeper levels of a culture. Values, the 
second level of culture, are reflected in how members interact with one another, how members 
interact with their environment, and what constructs, such as honesty, integrity or profitability, 
members share (Schein, 1992). The third and deepest level of organizational culture consists of 
the underlying assumptions. In healthy organizations, these assumptions provide the basis for the 
values. For example, if integrity is valued, the underlying assumption may be that only honesty 
can lead to success.  
After defining organizational culture and its tenets, researchers began to examine the 
relationship between organizational culture and performance. Kotter and Heskett (1992) have 
made a compelling case that culture does impact performance. More specifically, these authors 
outline three general types of culture (strong, strategically appropriate, and adaptive) and the way 
each of these cultures impact performance.  A strong culture is one in which the organization has 
an evident, notable style. A strategically appropriate culture is one that appropriately fits within 
its current internal and external environment. Finally, an adaptive culture is one that assists 
members anticipate and adapt to environmental change.  
Over the span of four years, Kotter and Heskett (1992) investigated the impact each of 
these three types of organizational culture can have on performance by analyzing performance 
metrics for hundreds of organizations.  Specifically, they identified which of the three culture 
types was present in each organization and examined the relationships between each specific 
culture type and successful outcomes. They found that there was a general positive correlation 
between strength of corporate culture and market value (r = .26), net income growth (r = .46), 
and return on average investment (r=.31); however, these correlations were relatively weak and 
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lacked consistency. After matching high performance organizations with low performance 
organizations and interviewing members, Kotter and Heskett (1992) found those individuals in 
companies with lower performance felt that their company’s culture hurt their performance and 
did not fit their industry, while those individuals in higher performing organizations felt their 
culture helped their performance and was a good fit for their industry.  
Kotter and Heskett (1992) found that the best performing organizations were those with 
an adaptive culture, where the culture encourages continuous adaptation and values change.  This 
change-embracing culture must come from leadership, and while the adaptive culture must value 
leadership, the leadership, reciprocally, must value the core constituencies of the organization 
(e.g., customers, stockholders and employees; Kotter, 1990). As a result, Kotter and Heskett 
(1992) posed the question “how much does the culture value excellent leadership from its 
managers?”  They found that individuals within higher-performing firms placed a significantly 
higher value on excellent leadership than those individuals within lower performing firms. 
Furthermore, those in higher performing firms valued their customers (Mhigher = 6.0; Mlower = 
4.6), employees (Mhigher = 5.8; Mlower = 4.1) and stockholders (Mhigher = 5.7; Mlower = 3.9) 
significantly more than those in lower performing firms. 
Previous research seems to suggest a relationship between the types of organizational 
culture and performance (Kotter & Heskett, 1992). More recent research has investigated other 
mediators of the relationship between an organization’s culture and its performance. Specifically, 
Balthazard, Cooke and Potter (2006) suggested that behavioral norms within an organization are 
reflective of that organization’s culture, or its values and assumptions, and may have a heavy 
impact on an organizations performance.  The authors surveyed over 60,000 participants using 
the Organizational Culture Inventory (OCI), an instrument that assesses twelve different 
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behavioral norms that, either consciously or unconsciously, may be required for members to fit 
in and meet an organization’s expectations (Cooke & Lafferty, 1989). Balthazard and colleagues 
(2006) found that each of the four behavioral norms classified as “constructive” was positively 
correlated with role clarity, communication quality, “fit” with organization, and job satisfaction, 
and negatively correlated with behavioral conformity.  Furthermore, these constructive norms 
were also positively correlated with performance drivers, such as quality of products/services, 
quality of customer service, adaptability, and quality of workplace, while negatively correlated 
with turnover.  
More recently, Smerek and Denison (2007) used archived data measuring four 
components of organizational culture – involvement, consistency, adaptability and mission – 
from 102 publicly traded companies. The researchers found that both adaptability and 
involvement were positively correlated with return on assets, and that this relationship was 
strongest in the third year after the culture measures were taken. This indicates that these two 
cultural elements may have their greatest impact on performance in the future. Furthermore, all 
four of these cultural elements were positively correlated with short-term sales growth, 
suggesting that short-term performance may be predicted by these elements. 
In summary, similar to Kotter and Heskett (1992), Balthazard and colleagues (2006) 
found that organizations that focus outwardly on customers and stockholders and internally on 
employee fit and communication have stronger performance. They also provided compelling 
evidence that members’ behavioral norms, indicative of the culture, were related to the 
organization’s performance. In addition, Smerek and Denison (2007) found that two elements of 
culture – involvement and adaptability – had a strong correlation to return on assets in the future 
and relate strongly to short term sales growth. Although each of the above studies is correlational 
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in nature, the results of these studies consistently suggest a relationship has emerged between 
those cultures that are adaptive and organizations that have consistently high performance.  
Assuming this link between culture and strong performance exists, the concept and process of 
culture formation takes on increased significance as culture formation may impact future 
organizational success.  
Culture Formation: A Leader’s Impact 
 Schein (1985) states that the “...only thing of real importance that leaders do is create and 
manage culture” (p.2) and that a culture takes shape from both the assumptions and theories of 
the founder as well as the organization’s collective lessons from its own unique experience 
(Schein, 1983).  According to Schein (1983), five principles form the structure of any culture: 
relationship to the environment; the nature of truth; the qualities of human nature; the nature of 
human activity; and the nature of human relationships. Leaders typically model these principles, 
both through what they focus on and how they react to critical events. Specifically, Schein 
(1983) suggested that culture is created through the observance of the set of behaviors 
demonstrated by leaders that immediately follow a critical incident and the evaluation of whether 
those behaviors are effective. 
 In an effort to determine whether leadership primarily influences culture or culture 
influences leadership, Sarros, Gray and Densten (2002) found that certain elements of leadership 
impacted culture far more than culture impacted leaders.  For example, a transactional 
leadership style, which assumes that the leader-follower relationship is a process of reward 
(success) and punishment (failure), accounted for 24% of the variance of the cultural aspect of 
emphasis on rewards.   
Organizational Culture Change 
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 In addition to driving cultural formation, leaders can also foster cultural change. Before 
understanding the way in which leaders serve as facilitators, it is important to first understand the 
nature of organizational culture change. Organizations find numerous reasons to change their 
culture, from increasing collaboration, initiative, and accountability (Kanter, 2004) to adapting to 
external change (Singh, 2006). Inherent in each of these culture change rationalizations is the 
basic desire to improve performance. Schein (1990) asserts that three steps need to occur in order 
to successfully change culture. First, leaders need to “unfreeze” the present system by outlining 
and discussing impending threats to the organization if no change occurs. Second, a new 
direction needs to be formalized along with a new set of assumptions; this step is the actual 
“change”. Finally, members of the organization need to be positively reinforced when their 
actions align with the new assumptions, and punished when they adhere to old assumptions. This 
third step is “refreezing” the new culture. 
 This three-step process is seemingly simple, yet culture is difficult to change. Smith 
(2003) reported that in a group of North American corporations that had attempted culture 
change, only 19% of managers rated the culture change as ‘extremely successful’.  Kotter and 
Haskett (1992) claim that culture is difficult to change due to the interdependence between and 
within the levels of culture, such as values and underlying assumptions. 
In order to successfully alter culture, leaders must address a situation that has previously 
been ignored, increase collaboration, and inspire initiative (Kanter, 2004). To emphasize this 
point, Kanter provides one of the only examples in the literature of organizational culture change 
pertaining to professional sport: the turnaround of the Philadelphia Eagles. Since Jeffrey Lurie 
purchased the organization in 1994, the Eagles have embarked on a remarkable turnaround.  
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Although they have yet to win a championship, the Eagles have been one of the most successful 
organizations in the NFL in the past ten years. 
 Although there has been significant research into the construct of organizational culture 
and change within business, this phenomenon has not been examined within professional sport 
other than the above reference by Kanter (2004).  Professional sport is simply a business with a 
unique product – a team.  Due to the compelling relationship between a healthy organizational 
culture and strong performance, it is arguable that the lack of success of a professional sport 
team can be symptomatic of a larger problem within that organization’s culture. Furthermore, 
new leadership is often required to make changes to an organization’s culture. While this leads to 
many inquiries that have yet to be explored in the sport literature, this study was designed to 
concentrate on one primary question (1) and two secondary questions (2, 3): 
1. In what manner do leaders create more of a performance-oriented culture in 
professional sport organizations? 
2. Are leaders in professional sport consciously aware of the critical elements of the 
culture of their organization? 
3. What similarities and differences exist in leaders’ efforts to bring about culture 
change across organizations? 
Method 
Participants 
Intensity sampling and operational construct sampling were utilized in selecting 
participants. Intensity sampling consists of selecting cases that are rich examples of the subject 
matter being studied (Patton, 2002). In this case, target participants were owners and/or general 
managers who have successfully brought about organizational culture change within their 
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respective professional sport teams as evidenced by their team’s on-field or on-court 
performance.  Operational construct sampling entails the utilization of real-world examples 
(Patton, 2002). Therefore, owners and/or general managers from the National Football League 
(NFL), National Basketball Association (NBA), and Major League Baseball (MLB) were 
interviewed.  
To be selected as participants for this research, leaders had to meet four specific criteria. 
First, the leader had to be the decision maker within his or her organization. Because decision-
makers vary between organizations (i.e., owner, general manager), the primary investigator 
determined whether the owner, general manager, or both make the majority of organizational 
decisions. This was accomplished through organizational research, including in-depth analysis of 
articles about personnel changes within the organization. In cases where there was confusion, the 
primary investigator called the organization to ask who made most of the day to day decisions. In 
one case multiple leaders were identified as decision-makers, and the primary investigator 
selected one.  The remaining three criteria are as follows: 
1. In the NBA and NFL, the leader’s respective team must have increased its winning 
percentage by 25% in consecutive years. Due to the high number of regular season games 
in MLB, the leader’s team must have increased its winning percentage by a total of 10% 
in a two year period.  
2. In addition to this increase in performance, the team must have maintained a record that 
is over .500 for three years after increasing its winning percentage. For example, even 
though the 1998 Boston Celtics increased their winning percentage by .256, they would 
not qualify as their overall record (36-46) was well below .500. This criterion prevents 
any team after 2004 from being included in this research. 
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3. The leader’s team must have had seasons with a winning percentage at or below .500 in 
at least two of the three seasons prior to the increase in performance. 
The primary investigator identified all potential participants through the use of team, 
organizational and sport websites (i.e., www.sportsecyclopedia.com), each of which contained 
resources for professional sport teams including history, records, playoff appearances and other 
general information.  The primary investigator then cross-referenced team records with historical 
personnel information to identify both owners and general managers that met the specified 
criteria. 
Since 1995, there have been 32 organizations across the three sports that meet the criteria 
stated above (n = 12, MLB; n = 12, NFL; n = 8, NBA). Of these 32 cases, the primary 
investigator attempted to select a representative sample of both roles (general manager, owner) 
and sport type (basketball, football, baseball).  
The final sample (N = 6) included two owners and one general manager from the NFL, 
two general managers from the NBA, and one general manager from Major League Baseball.  
Participants’ team information is included in Table 1, and a brief biography of each participant 
can be found in Appendix A. 
Instrumentation 
The interview protocol was developed by the primary investigator and modified by an 
expert in qualitative research (Appendix B).  The final interview elicits a description of 
participants’ backgrounds, along with the recalled culture when the leader arrived, the leader’s 
values, change processes, critical events that have required the leadership of the participant, and 
the vision of the participant. Interview questions were designed to align with Schein’s (1983) 
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five principles that form the structure of organizational culture. These principles along with 
questions that align with each can be found in Table 2.  
Procedure 
Each participant was contacted via telephone or email. In most cases, the primary 
researcher had no direct contact with the executive prior to the meeting, as the meeting was 
arranged through an administrative assistant. A cover letter explaining the rights of research 
participants was emailed to participants once they agreed to an interview (Appendix C).  In order 
to further inform the interview, web research was conducted on the participant and the 
organization. The primary investigator then traveled to each participant’s work location to 
conduct the interview. Immediately prior to beginning the interview, the primary investigator 
again explained the purposes of the study and risks as per Institutional Review Board 
regulations.  
Semi-structured, open-ended interviews were conducted with each participant. The 
protocol provided the framework for the interview, while the primary investigator asked various 
follow-up questions based on participants’ responses.  All interviews were recorded for accuracy, 
using a digital voice recorder. The primary investigator also took detailed notes during the 
interview. Interviews averaged 59 minutes, ranging from 31 minutes to 76 minutes.  
The primary investigator also obtained permission to view facilities in order to examine 
artifacts that offered further insight into the interview and an organization’s culture.  A simple 
artifact checklist was utilized to guide the primary investigator in his observations. (Appendix 
D).  
Data Analysis & Triangulation 
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Upon completion of the interviews, each recording was digitally copied to protect the 
integrity of the data. Each interview was fully transcribed by the primary researcher and double-
checked for accuracy.  A modified interpretive analysis was used to guide the inquiry into the 
data. The purpose of this type of analysis is for the researcher to “produce meaning that makes 
sense of the social phenomena” being studied (p. 180; Hatch, 2002). The primary investigator 
followed the general format outlined by Hatch (2002) in the interpretive analysis process, which 
includes reading the data for a sense of the whole, identifying impressions in the form of memos, 
and then coding the transcriptions where impressions are supported or challenged; however, 
along with the creation of memos during the first reading, open coding was also employed. The 
researcher also attempted to increase his own awareness of his biases and prejudices in order to 
reduce his influence to the overall process (Merriam & Associates, 2002; see Appendix E).  
In addition, data was analyzed both within case on multiple levels including leader, sport 
and roles and cross-case, or across leaders, sports and roles.  Furthermore, multiple levels of 
coding were utilized. First, open coding, or identifying and tentatively naming potential 
categories of the phenomena, was used to initially examine the data. Second, through comparing 
and combining codes and examining memos, open codes were separated into general categories. 
Finally, relationships between categories emerged as the higher order themes.  The resultant 
codebook is included as Appendix F. 
This research incorporated multiple forms of triangulation. First, six separate collection 
points were utilized as each participant was asked the same set of questions. Second, data 
triangulation occurred through the use of both interview data and document/artifact analysis. 
Document/artifact analysis provided both context for interviews and ensured that participants’ 
words are reinforced with the items and information an organization chooses to display. Third, 
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investigator triangulation took place as a second researcher, who has extensive training in 
qualitative analysis, separately examined and coded the data to provide a source for inter-rater 
reliability. Disparities in the coding process between the primary investigator and the secondary 
researcher were discussed until a consensus was reached.  Finally, participant triangulation was 
used as each participant was provided the opportunity to offer feedback on the conclusions of the 
primary investigator. 
Results 
 To assess the first and second research questions, interpretive qualitative analysis was 
conducted. Five separate themes emerged, each of which had multiple subthemes.  Emergent 
themes included symptoms of a dysfunctional culture, my way, walk the talk, embedding new 
culture, and our way. These themes have been organized into a schematic that outlines the 
process of culture change in professional sport organizations (see Figure 1), and will be 
discussed in-depth in the following section. Textual examples extracted from interview 
transcriptions will be provided along with an in-depth explanation of each theme and 
corresponding subtheme. In select cases, the primary investigator has included words or phrases 
within brackets that will assist with context. 
Symptoms of a Dysfunctional Culture 
 Five of six participants were aware of dysfunctional elements within the culture they had 
joined. In some instances, symptoms were tangible, such as sub-standard facilities or a win-loss 
record; in other instances they were abstract, relating to attitudes or values. Examples were wide 
ranging and have been organized into two subthemes: negative environment and a losing habit.  
Negative environment. Five of the six participants were able to identify adverse elements of 
their respective organization’s environment, both physical and psychological. Physical elements 
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included poor facilities, while psychological elements consisted of the absence of important 
values such as trust, honesty and integrity. Additionally, leaders identified values that were not 
perceived to be conducive to success, including selfishness, placing too much emphasis on 
monetary profit and minimizing the value of players. In two cases, new leaders discovered that 
bad leadership had been contributing to the negative environment.    
 The working environment was very poor, in the bowels of [our] stadium. – 
Owner1, NFL 
There had been some cultural issues with respect to where winning and where 
players stood in the pecking order…the focus had been before [owner] took over 
on maximizing revenues above all else. Not that that's not a good thing, but some 
of it was at the expense of facilities, some of it was at the expense of efficiencies, 
and some of it was at the expense of alienating players. – GM, NFL 
 Losing habit.  In many ways, teams had become accustomed to mediocrity.  Across all 
participants a losing habit had become the norm, bad decisions were common, and there was 
little confidence in the organization. Furthermore, a minimal level of accountability, effort and 
communication existed throughout the organization. All of these factors contributed to a low fan 
base. 
The culture was kind of one where they accepted being mediocre, they accepted 
that they were a mid-market club, and you heard that a lot. And everyone 
accepted “we’re a mid-market club; our revenues are about halfway through”. 
– GM, MLB 
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The team just had not been successful for a long time. What transpires when you 
aren't successful for a long time is you get a lot of bad attitudes, you get a lot of 
“well, here we go again” type things, because you just haven't had any success.  
And it was always the glass is half empty rather than half full. – GM 2, NBA 
My Way 
 Simultaneous to noting the dysfunctional elements of the culture, leaders soon let the 
organization know that there was a new way to do things. In all but two cases, this occurred 
immediately after they assumed their new position. In one case, the “new way” was delayed 
roughly one year so the new owner could get acclimated to sport ownership.  In another case, the 
owner had been with the franchise for his entire adult life. The second major theme, My Way, 
was best articulated by GM 1 in the NFL when reflecting upon a key decision during his first 
days in his new position as President and General Manager: 
I also thought it would send a message to everyone else in the building that this 
is a new era, with new people, and a new approach to things and, this is the way 
we're going to do it.  
This theme was prominently expressed by all participants, and was comprised of five subthemes: 
vision, my values, change personnel, grow people, and explicit communication.  
Vision. Vision was commonly expressed with the very simple sentiment of winning, or 
making the organization better. Additionally, this subtheme was often coupled with the planning 
process, or a blueprint for winning.  
It's win. Take this club to the top, but do it the right way. Do it by having a good 
scouts, who sign good players, who will be passed on to good player 
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development people, who would all understand [our] way of playing the game 
on the field. – GM, MLB 
I hand wrote on a piece of paper five points. And I would read them and have 
them with me every night when I went to bed, and when I woke up in the 
morning. It was really more of how to become a very good football team. But 
with that is obviously a very good organization. Owner 1, NFL 
My values. Values were brought to the organization by the leader, and provided a 
foundation for future success and a basis for organizational decisions. Values were diverse, and 
include honesty, integrity, loyalty, trust, commitment, dignity, professionalism, philanthropy and 
team. Many values related specifically to the leader’s belief in how people should treat one 
another. Values were often implicitly expressed through stories and anecdotes about past 
decisions.  
I've always said that people have my trust and loyalty implicitly and will always 
have it until you prove to me that you don't deserve it. – GM 1, NBA 
I think that people understand that we have integrity and that's the prime part of 
the way we operate. We try not to lose our integrity because of some difficult 
decisions. – Owner 2, NFL 
I really feel like if you can respect and validate the people around you then can 
get the best from them. – Owner 1, NFL 
 Change personnel. Five of the six participants explicitly stated that it was necessary to 
bring new people into the organization, individuals who shared their values and were familiar 
with their methods. When looking for new personnel, whether it was front-office, coaches, or 
players, four leaders expressed that they minimized experience and instead looked at a person’s 
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potential, or ‘ceiling’. Considerable risk accompanied the decision to bring in a coach with no 
experience, for if the person failed at their task then it was likely that the leader would be 
blamed. Even with that knowledge, all six participants had hired a coach with no previous head-
coaching experience. Additionally, the concept of hiring the “best people” consistently arose 
indicating that a potential employee, whether a player or coach, had to have credibility, work 
hard, be innovative, passionate and have a positive attitude.  
Once things go wrong in a certain way so long, you know the only way to change 
that is to start changing the pieces of the group. – GM 1, NBA 
That's one of the management mistakes or hiring mistakes that a lot of people make 
- that they put experience higher on the criteria level than they should. – GM, MLB 
A lot of it was having to hire key executives that would be the, I guess you'd call 
them, the lieutenants of change, the ones that would absolutely make it their highest 
priority to be part of the change of the culture and the attitude and of the whole 
direction. – Owner1, NFL 
 Grow people. All participants expressed interest in the growth of those who worked for 
them. This growth occurred with employees in their present jobs, when they advanced to new 
positions, and when they adopted a new mindset or philosophy. The growth mindset that each 
leader displayed demonstrated a long-term investment in individuals working for the 
organization and a sincere passion for development. 
 My philosophy has always been to try and help people do their jobs better. Because 
if players don't do well and coaches don't coach well, the team's not going to be 
successful, and then you're not going to be successful. – GM 1, NBA 
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One of the great joys of coaching or being involved in this business is seeing the 
people you work with accept your philosophy and grow. – GM, NFL 
Our vision is to bring in good people, and you just promote them, you train them, 
you promote them, and you keep them. – GM, MLB 
Explicit communication. Simply having a compelling vision was not enough to promote 
change. It was critical for leaders to honestly and clearly communicate their vision, plan, and 
expectations to both players and staff. All six participants verbalized this sentiment. These 
communication efforts occurred either on a scheduled basis or in an ad hoc manner. 
Additionally, the coach was expected to act as a critical advocate and mouthpiece for 
communicating participants’ expectations. 
I meet with the marketing and sales staff and front office staff twice a year, once in 
the off season to explain what we're going to do in the off season, and once at the 
beginning of the season. – GM, NFL 
You try to tell people what you expect and what you want to do and after that you 
leave them alone and let them do their job. – GM 1, NBA 
I always try to talk to the players four or five times a year. I’ll have a meeting 
where we talk about where we are, what we need to do. – GM 2, NBA 
Walk the Talk 
The third major theme endorsed by all participants, Walk the Talk, alludes to the method 
used to implement the plan that allowed each organization to progress towards the vision of its 
leader. Stated simply, this is ‘how’ the organization found success. This occurred through a 
mixture of daily events and critical organizational decisions.   
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You know, you say it and say it, but it's how you do it. You can say things and not 
really carry it out, you know what I mean? So we try to do it both ways. We try to 
say our goal is to win, and we're going to do whatever it takes, and then do it. – 
Owner 2, NFL 
Once again, this theme was often articulated through stories that reflected a passion for their jobs 
and an awareness of how their actions were scrutinized by those they were tasked to lead.  
When I was GM here, I might get home at 11 at night, but at 8:15 I was here, why? 
Because the people here in this department, I wanted to show them, hey, I want 
them dedicated. It's not fair for me to stroll in at 10:00 but they have to be here at 
8:30. No. But that's what you do, you lead by example. – GM, MLB 
The participants suggested that this sentiment was often reflected in the players that each leader 
pursued: 
Even though he's [player] not a very talkative guy, he leads by what he does, he 
guards, he does all the little things you have to do to win.- GM 2, NBA 
Walk the Talk encompasses four subthemes, including day to day, obstacles to change, critical 
events, and artifact impact.  
Day to day. Three leaders repetitively acted on a daily basis to communicate their message 
and perpetuate the plan. The manner in which the leader handled non-critical decisions was also 
important. Furthermore, it was crucial to maintain an attention to detail. 
It's really everyday decisions, it's what you do, you try to do things right. – Owner 
2, NFL 
One of the keys to the success has definitely been an attention to detail. It’s not like 
you say, here’s a weight room, or here’s a training table. What are you surrounding 
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it with? Exactly what is the equipment? What is the rehab mechanism? Do we have 
everything you can have to get a human being to heal? And can we do better? - 
Owner 1, NFL 
Obstacles to change. The integrity of the leader’s vision/plan must be upheld despite 
organizational barriers that had previously been used as excuses. It was important for executives 
to view these as challenges to be overcome rather than legitimate reasons for failure. Examples 
included a team’s perceived small market status, lack of a fan base and a harsh economic 
environment.  Some of the same physical symptoms of a negative culture identified in the 
negative environment subtheme, including dilapidated facilities or a lack of a practice facility, 
were acknowledged with the caveat that they were no longer a legitimate reason for poor 
performance.   
Part of it is we had no practice facility before that. We were practicing in the 
Salvation Army.  We practiced over at the [police station] for a couple years, where 
you had a two hour window of your day when you could practice. – GM 1, NBA 
What I tried to do was to, to change the culture to the degree that we are going to 
win, it has nothing to do with where we're located, we can sell tickets, we can be 
successful here. – GM 2, NBA 
One critical component of obstacles to change was media and fan pressure. All participants 
explicitly stated that the media could be a powerful force and would attempt to derail the 
organization’s focus in a quest for the next big story. Both media and fans were sometimes 
critical of an organization’s actions, or inaction, as each group craved the “quick fix”.  It was 
necessary for leaders and organizational members to ignore this pressure an remain focused on 
the larger plan.  
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There's gonna be a lot of public criticism, and there's gonna be a lot of back biting, 
and there's gonna be a lot of second-guessing, and you just have to ride that out. 
You know, you just have to stick your chin into the wind and ride it out. – GM, MLB 
If you really want to run a successful organization, a lot of the outside world wants 
a quick fix and will always go for the quick fix, however they perceive that to be. – 
Owner 1, NFL 
 Critical events. Five of six participants relayed examples of important events that they 
presided over. Each was a value-driven decision that relayed to the organization that either new 
values existed or old behaviors would not be tolerated. Examples were wide-ranging, and 
included changes in the front office, on the field, and with the coaching staff. 
The specific event that turned us around was trading Player 1 for Player 2. Player 
1 was the face of that franchise, he was much younger than Player 2, at the time we 
did it it was a very controversial trade, because a lot of people felt, ‘why are you 
trading this great young talent for an older guy with problems?’…[it 
communicated] that we weren’t going to have selfish people. That we were gonna 
have people that were committed to the team, and it didn’t matter who they were, 
that if they didn’t do that, then we were going to get rid of them – GM 2, NBA 
[We were] widely criticized that we didn't pick a running back [with the second 
pick in the NFL draft]. But if you go back to those five principles, there was no way, 
unless there was no quarterback, that we were going to pick a running back. – 
Owner 1, NFL 
 Artifact impact. All participants relayed examples of physical improvements that they had 
generated that reflect their values and concern for other members of the organization. Each 
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participant mentioned specific improvements, in some cases dramatic, made to facilities that 
positively impacted players. More importantly, changes were a tangible example of the value 
that the participants placed on players. Each participant was consciously aware that the physical 
environment around athletes made a large impact. 
One of the real key things was designing this building where the cafeteria is the 
center-place of the whole building. It’s right in the middle, purposefully. It’s right 
in the first floor. And it’s where everybody comes together every day.  And from day 
one in here, you had departments that never even talked to each other, barely know 
each other’s name. You had football people having lunch with marketing people. 
Just the whole cross-pollination. – Owner 1, NFL 
We had to have the rocks out in left center field…that’s neat and the fans liked it. 
But they were a little too brightly painted, and our left handed hitters complained 
and they hadn’t done anything about it.  So we had to raise our voices a bit and 
finally got some action on it. – GM, MLB 
Embedding New Culture 
 With a steady focus on the plan, each organization eventually saw tangible signs of 
success, which demonstrated the validity of the new values and philosophies that the leader had 
brought to the organization. Success was experienced through both steady improvement and in a 
dramatic fashion, such as a World Series win.  In both cases, success helped to embed the new 
values into the fabric of the organization.  Embedding New Culture is composed of two 
subthemes: new success and turning point.  
 New success. Each participant eventually experienced success with his organization. This 
subtheme refers to slow, steady improvement which then induces renewed commitment from 
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organizational members. Success was not always actualized in the form of wins, as a team 
sometimes noticed improvement that was not reflected in their record. Most importantly, the new 
success imparted a new sense of confidence in the organization along with a slow entrenchment 
of the leader’s philosophy.  
The best thing that happened early on was that we started winning more games 
right away, and that's healthy because it creates the sense of belief that what you're 
doing is right. And it started to engender confidence with the players and 
coaches…so the whole mentality started to shift over to the, the whole thing, ‘it's 
the same old thing again’ to ‘oh, this might be something different’. – GM 1, NBA 
We ended up having a decent year, not a great year, didn't win anything in 2000, 
but had a decent year. So that got people thinking, ‘hey, you know what, this is 
going to work’.– GM, MLB 
 Turning point. Occasionally, an organization came to the sudden realization that they had 
significantly improved, or a precipitous event transpired that collectively assisted an organization 
form a new world-view. It was possible for teams to experience both slow improvement, as 
outlined above, while also having a sudden realization that the newfound success was not 
fleeting. 
We jumped out of the gate and beat some good teams, and then all of a sudden, we 
were, I don't know, 24-17 or something like that and had a chance to make a run at 
the playoffs. – GM 1, NBA  
The day we moved into the [practice] complex was really one of the real changing 
of culture events. And it went from having some of the worst facilities in the NFL, to 
arguably the best at the time in terms of working environment. And everybody, from 
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lowest level employees to superstar players, it was sort of a ‘wow’ moment. – 
Owner 1, NFL 
We ended up having the best record in the East [conference], we won over 50 
games, we won the Eastern conference playoffs, went to the finals. – GM 2, NBA 
In one instance, one participant relayed that a senior executive in his organization was removed 
and the impact throughout the organization when they learned that the participatn would be 
filling that role: 
And everything changed. In fact, it just reached the field, the ticket sellers, 
everybody. Everybody said,‘ whoa, we're getting some support here, you know, this 
is good!’  
Our Way 
 The fifth and final theme to emerge was Our Way, which was expressed by all six 
participants. This theme indicates that a culture shift had transpired and members had a new 
‘lens’ through which to interpret the world.  Our Way refers to how an organization selected 
members, how they made decisions, how things were run internally, and its collective values. 
Additionally, this extends to the new vernacular that organizational members shared, as well as 
any new traditions that were established.  
First of all we require that everyone, we call it everyone who “touches the team”, 
share that philosophy. They've got to embrace that [team’s] philosophy. – GM, NFL 
Our philosophy is not that we're going to build this organization by trading. It's not 
the best way to build it. So we're going to hang on to our guys and all that, and let 
our fans connect with the guys now. – GM, MLB 
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We sign a player and we talk about our philosophy here is different from…We just 
don't just follow a routine, because someone else did something we're going to do 
the same. We go with the idea of what is right. – Owner 2, NFL 
Our Way consists of three subthemes, including our values, better decisions and independent 
thought.  
 Our values. Expressed by all six participants, this subtheme encompasses the sentiment 
of valuing people within the organization, especially players, along with leadership and the fans. 
These values were again expressed through the decisions and actions of organizational members. 
For example, one participant made the decision to drop a player, but gave the player the option 
of where he wanted to go. When asked why he did that, the participant implicitly demonstrated 
his respect for the player by stating: 
He'd given really good service to the team, and he deserved that.  
One NFL owner essentially expressed his value in people by protecting players and coaches from 
poor character players: 
I feel it’s our responsibility to not bring in players that are like that. And we’ve 
made mistakes, but you owe it to the players you have to not bring in bad guys.  
Additional excerpts demonstrating the values of people, players, fans and leadership included the 
following:  
How they feel, how they view themselves, how they view their preparation, how they 
approach the things that they, that they have to do to both win and be valued assets 
for the franchise and the community is the most important thing. – GM, NFL 
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You know, talking to people, and letting them know that you value their opinion, 
and you have to say okay, well we don't agree with that, or we do we've got to pick 
it up and play it through. – Owner 2, NFL 
I think our team does as good of job with the fans, trying to include fans, being fan 
friendly, I think we do as good as anybody. – GM 2, NBA 
 Better decisions. In addition to having new organizational values, the new leader, through 
the culture, facilitated better decisions. Five participants relayed that decisions were made 
according to the values of the leader and according to the organizational plan. This often applied 
to the type of player an organization wanted on its roster. Furthermore, members within the 
organization felt more confident in leadership and organizational decisions.  
And once you set out on that path, you have to have a plan, and you’ve got to work 
that plan, and you can’t deviate from it, unless you’re convinced, and people that 
really know, are convinced, that deviation is the right thing to do. And those are the 
hardest decisions of all. – GM, NFL 
Eckstein was the guy he asked waivers on, and we jumped on it. And, got him over 
here. I had a scouting report from one particular scout. And I said gee, if this guy's 
right, Eckstein might be perfect for this club. – GM, MLB 
 Independent thought.  To remain successful, five leaders suggested that it was important 
for them to think “outside the box”.  The organization had to make a special effort to think 
differently from the rest of its respective league. Leaders expressed that money could not be the 
primary driver behind decisions, and that they had to remain adaptable and open to change while 
still following their blueprint.  
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Because you don't want get stuck like with the same ideas that were brought in 12 
years ago. We got to be that constantly innovative, looking at new ways of 
evaluating players, new ways of structuring areas of the operation. – Owner 1, NFL  
When these guys are saying that everyone's doing, this dude’s doing this, I say 
“they're not [us], we do this thing [our] way” But we're not gonna follow because 
some other team does it. If we think its right we will. – Owner 2, NFL 
Culture Change Cycle 
The main themes and corresponding subthemes have been organized into a chronological 
schematic that illustrates the process of culture change in professional sport organizations as 
constructed by the primary investigator and the six participants, entitled the Culture Change 
Cycle (see Figure 1).  The Culture Change Cycle serves to explain the first two research 
questions and will be explained in depth in the next section.  
Artifact Analysis 
 Data for each organization, collected using the Simple Artifact Checklists (Appendix D), 
was compiled to further triangulate data from interviews (see Artifact Frequency Analysis; 
Appendix G). Additionally, artifacts within each organization were documented and linked back 
to one or multiple major themes.  
 Not surprisingly, no artifacts were found that represented Symptoms of a Dysfunctional 
Culture, and only one artifact, a “Perseverance” poster in a general manager’s office, was found 
to represent My Way. Multiple items were found to represent Walk the Talk, including new 
practice facilities, player lounges with pool tables, video games, and TVs and cooks provided for 
breakfast and lunch. Numerous artifacts also represented Embedding New Culture, such as a 
hallway with only pictures of past Pro Bowl players and framed newspaper articles chronicling 
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successes from recent seasons. Finally, artifacts such as an intentionally designed open building, 
the placement of a cafeteria in the center of a building, and past Lombardi (Super Bowl) trophies 
prominently displayed exemplified the Our Way theme.  
Discussion 
The primary purpose of this research was to study how leaders in professional sport 
changed culture. Secondary purposes were to examine whether leaders were aware of different 
elements of organizational culture, and to identify differences in the culture change process 
across sport and across roles. Through further examination of the emergent themes it became 
apparent that each of the above research questions was closely related. Each theme of the Culture 
Change Cycle can be viewed as an abstracted step in the change process and will be supported 
by previous research/literature.  
First, a new leader arrives and witnesses the collateral damage from past leadership and 
poor management (Symptoms of a Negative Culture). Second, the leader implements a new way 
of doing things (My Way) and sets out to communicate his values, vision, and plan.  The 
literature supports multiple subthemes in My Way. For example, explicit communication, 
expressed by all participants, outlined the constant formal and informal communications methods 
that a leader employed to articulate his plan and vision. From the perspective of individuals who 
have taken part in large-scale change efforts, one of the key mediators to successful culture 
change efforts is a high degree of communication (Covin & Kilmann, 1990). Specifically, 
consistent communication on change efforts had a positive impact on followers.  Conversely, 
Smeltzer (1991) found that a primary reason for the failure of change efforts is the presence of 
rumors, often predicated by the lack of timely and accurate information from leadership.  
Additionally, My Values was another subtheme under My Way which describes how leaders 
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express their values to those around them. Lord and Brown (2001) suggest that leaders can 
influence the values of others explicitly through communication, or implicitly through action. 
More importantly, through the process of making their values known, leaders can provide a 
normative roadmap for acceptable behaviors within the organization (Meglino & Ravlin, 1998).  
Another subtheme from My Way that was supported in the literature was vision. Collins 
and Porras (1991) suggest that without a vision, an organization can only react to the future 
rather than create the future.  Cummings and Worley (2005) indicate that creating a vision is a 
key component to the organizational change process. Vision must also integrate aspects of core 
ideology (values, purpose) and an envisioned future (dreams, hopes and aspirations).  All 
participants suggested that their primary goal was to “win”, or “win championships”, but many 
added the sentiment to do it “the right way”, suggesting that their values played an integral role 
in how they wanted to win.  As Schein (1992) stated, an organization must have good reason to 
be receptive to a vision. Within each of these organizations, the accumulated frustration of years 
of mediocrity may have provided ample reasoning to embrace a new vision. 
Third, through both daily and key organizational decisions, the leader repeatedly 
emphasizes the new values (Walk the Talk). One obvious assumption of the Walk the Talk theme 
is that the leader is present through the change process. In support of this process, Smith (2003) 
found that one of the strongest correlates to successful culture change was the presence of the 
sponsor throughout the entire process, and an equally strong correlate to failure was the 
departure of the leader or sponsor during the change process.  Kotter (2007) further stated that 
one of the biggest mistakes leaders make in change efforts is under-communicating the vision. In 
essence, the day to day communication efforts that the leader makes in the Culture Change Cycle 
emphasizes repeatedly that the leader will not be distracted from his vision.  In fact, Kotter 
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(2007) used the same terminology utilized in this research when he stated that leaders learn to 
“walk the talk” and become a living symbol of the new corporate culture.  Fourth, the 
organization experiences successes, both large and small (Embedding the New Culture).  A 
primary condition for successful culture change outlined by Gagliardi (1986) was that an 
organization needs to collectively experience success with the new values. Finally, a new culture 
(Our Way), complete with new values and improved decisions, is crystallized.   
Culture Change as a Cycle 
The idea of culture change as a cycle is different from past conceptualizations of 
organizational culture change. For example, Schein (1990) utilized Kurt Lewin’s model for 
change (unfreeze, change, re-freeze; Kent, 2001) to suggest that the cultural change process is 
linear and that the resultant new culture is static.  For the highly successful leaders participating 
in this research, a key component that has allowed their organizations to maintain success for 
prolonged periods is the process of introspective evaluation that each goes through at the end of 
each season. This process identified procedures and assumptions that were working, and those 
that were not. This process suggests that the resultant culture was not completely frozen.  This 
idea was best captured by one NFL general manager: 
And one of the things we always want to do is question on the mechanics of what 
we're doing.  
The concept of adaptability and an openness to change is critical for continued 
organizational success and has been found to be directly correlated to organizational 
performance (Kotter & Heskett, 1992; Smerek & Denison, 2007). Kanter (1983) states 
unequivocally that it is not only advisable, but necessary, for an organization to innovate and 
change in order to keep up with both internal and external market factors.  If an organization 
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bypasses this introspective process, it may lead to decreased performance and a cultural fracture, 
as organizational members would have evidence that current values are not conducive to success. 
Examples of this type of failure exist across the professional sport landscape: once highly 
successful organizations stubbornly cling to past formulas for success. Singh (2006) suggests 
that this ‘hubris’ is a major reason that organizations become obsolete.  By consistently 
evaluating performance and looking for ways to improve, the organization ensures that its 
methods remain relevant and safeguards itself against hubris. The participants in this study 
would suggest that this introspective process occurs within the Our Way step and is inclusive of 
the subtheme, independent thought.   
To summarize, this introspective process then leads to a new My Way, resulting in a 
modified blueprint for Walk the Talk, causing new elements of culture to be engrained, which 
then subtly changes Our Way. In other words, subtle changes consistently refine the 
organization’s culture and its belief of the “right way”. 
Although the culture change within successful sport organizations may not result in 
completely static culture, this does not imply that an organization does not have mechanisms in 
place that help maintain its present values. For example, Wallach (1983) indicated that 
organizations ensure there is a strong match with new employees during the hiring process, while 
individuals applying for membership also attempt to ensure that there is a culture match.  
However, as members join an organization and old members depart, the culture may undergo 
imperceptible changes. 
Despite the Culture Change Cycle’s presentation as a clean, step-by-step process, there 
can be significant overlap between steps.  For example, new values would not only be engrained 
in the Embedding New Culture step, but may also occur in the Walk the Talk step as the critical 
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decisions of leaders play a large role in disseminating new values to organizational members 
(Schein, 1990) In fact, Schein (1990) asserts that a leader’s focus, along with their reaction to 
critical events are two embedding mechanisms for new culture.  
Differences Across Roles 
No differences were identified between the cultural change process as outlined by owners 
as compared to those outlined by general managers. One difference of note was that one NFL 
owner’s team had the most established culture, as the theme of Our Way was most prominent in 
his interview. This can be attributed to methodological errors in the criteria used for 
participation. In reviewing historical data, it became obvious that his organization qualified for 
this study on a technicality. His team met the qualifications for participation in this study in 
2001. In the three years prior, the team had win-loss records of 7-9, 6-10, and 9-7, respectively. 
However, in each of the six seasons prior to their 1998 7-9 campaign, the team made the playoffs 
and had five double-digit win seasons.  This illustrates that the seasons between 1998 and 2000 
may have been an anomaly rather than evidence of a poor culture. The historical data, in 
conjunction with the interview, leads one to believe that this team’s successful culture had been 
long established with a strong tradition, an avid fan base, and multiple Super Bowl 
Championship seasons.  Additionally, the consistency of leadership in this participant’s 
organization was an anomaly as compared to the other participants’ organizations, where 
relatively recent changes in ownership had transpired.  
Differences Across Sport 
 One major difference materialized with basketball executives, where the two participants 
consistently mentioned players, player acquisitions, and draft picks as significant causes for their 
team’s turnaround, more so than executives in baseball or football. Even when asked about 
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values, these participants mentioned specific player acquisitions that reflected their values. 
Although all involved placed a premium on talent, the general managers in basketball seemingly 
placed more weight on the player-personnel aspect of culture change, which fell under the My 
Way theme of the Culture Change Cycle.  
 A basketball team is smaller than both football and baseball teams. A NFL team is 
allowed 53 players on its active roster, with 11 players on the field at any given time. An MLB 
team allows 42 players, with nine players on the field in defensive situations, and only one to 
four players on offense, depending on base runners. In contrast, an NBA roster has 12 active 
players, with five on the court at any time. Each NBA player plays both offense and defense. In 
fact, one NBA GM stated: 
Basketball is a little unique in that respect...because one player - performance wise 
anyway, in basketball, - can really dramatically impact a team's performance 
because of the small number of players and the nature of the game. Take our team 
now. If somehow we could go out and acquire Lebron James for some, without 
trading away your whole team, I mean just in theory to acquire a player like that it 
would dramatically impact the performance of your team. 
Although no literature could be located focusing on culture change and group size, 
Dunbar (1996), an evolutionary psychologist, suggested that social complexity increases 
exponentially with group size. For example, a manager overseeing four others has to 
maintain four individual relationships along with six third-party relationships; in a group 
of 20, a manager must manage 19 direct relationships, 171 third-party relationships, and 
numerous 3-4 person relationships with potentially competing interests. Based on 
Dunbar's numbers it is arguable that culture change may be more difficult and time-
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consuming for a large group (i.e, football, baseball) than for a small group (basketball) 
simply because of the greater number of relationships that need to be managed, along 
with the greater number of individuals that need to be convinced that culture change is 
necessary.   
Limitations  
It should be noted that the Culture Change Cycle is based on the integration perspective, 
which is perhaps the most dogmatic view of culture as it offers little room for ambiguity 
(Meyerson & Martin, 1987). Three assumptions were made in the creation of this model, which 
coincide with the three assumptions of the integration perspective: consistency of cultural 
manifestations, consensus among cultural members, and a belief that leaders create the culture. 
Martin (1992) suggests that a single perspective of an organization’s culture could potentially be 
misleading.  Because only the leader from each organization was interviewed, it was impossible 
to learn whether the meanings and values they attributed to specific cultural manifestations were 
consistent or shared with other members at different levels.  The primary assumption, based upon 
performance data of the organization, was that the leader was the change agent and his values 
permeated the organization. The only way to verify this is to speak with other members in the 
organization. Although this was beyond the scope of this study, it is a potential line of inquiry for 
future research on organizational culture in professional sport. 
Additionally, the retrospective nature of this qualitative inquiry may lend itself recall-
error, which Patton (2002) suggests can be a weakness to qualitative inquiry. The most recent 
turning point, as outlined in the methods section, for participants in this study occurred in 2002.  
It is possible that the positive changes each organization has experienced could have biased 
participants to report the “good” things that occurred and exclude the negative 
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As with most qualitative research, generalizability does not apply (Guba, 1978). 
However, “transferability”, or the ability to find congruence in a separate context, is applicable 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Therefore, this research is only transferable to culture change within 
sport organizations that fit the context of those that participated in this research.  
Summary & Future Directions 
Schein (1992) states, “the bottom line for leaders is that if they do not become 
conscious of the cultures in which they are embedded, those cultures will manage them. 
Cultural understanding is desirable for all of us, but it is essential to leaders if they are to 
lead.”  Leaders participating in this research all had an acute awareness of the cultural 
elements of their organization, with the commonality that each leader’s respective 
organization has experienced a high level of success while the participant has been at the 
helm. Accordingly, understanding the organizational culture change process could prove 
beneficial for sport psychology consultants as it would provide further context for 
consultations. For traditional sport psychology consultations with teams and individual 
athletes, knowing if an organization is trying to change culture could provide valuable 
insight to an athlete’s or a team’s struggles; knowing where an organization is in the 
culture change process may provide the opportunity to assist leadership in changing and 
embedding new values. Improved cultural understanding may also provide an avenue for 
new consultations with organizational leaders in sport beyond the traditional methods of 
working with individual athletes or coaches.  
Future lines of inquiry into the culture change phenomenon would benefit from 
gaining the perspective of members at different levels of an organization, both vertically 
and horizontally, and learning whether they share a similar perspective on cultural 
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meanings. Players could share insight about their view of the organization’s culture, 
providing information that can be triangulated with senior and mid-level management 
across departments.  An additional area of inquiry could be the comparison of the 
cultures within high-performing organizations with those of under-performing 
organizations in order to establish similarities and differences amongst leaders of both. 
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Table 1. Participant Team Information 
League Year Team Wins Losses Ties Win % Win%Incr Qualify? Owner General Manager
NFL 1995 NFL 9 7 0 0.563
NFL 1996 NFL 9 7 0 0.563 0
NFL 1997 NFL 3 13 0 0.188 -0.375
NFL 1998 NFL 3 13 0 0.188 0
NFL 1999 NFL 13 3 0 0.813 0.625 x
NFL 2000 NFL 10 6 0 0.625 -0.188 x
NFL 2001 NFL 6 10 0 0.375 -0.25 x
NFL 2002 NFL 10 6 0 0.625 0.25
NFL 2003 NFL 12 4 0 0.75 0.125 x
NFL 2004 NFL 12 4 0 0.75 0 x
NFL 2005 NFL 14 2 0 0.875 0.125
NFL 2006 NFL 12 4 0 0.75 -0.125
NFL 2007 NFL 13 3 0 0.813 0.063
NFL 1995 NFL 10 6 0 0.625
NFL 1996 NFL 10 6 0 0.625 0
NFL 1997 NFL 6 9 1 0.406 -0.219
NFL 1998 NFL 3 13 0 0.188 -0.218
NFL 1999 NFL 5 11 0 0.313 0.125
NFL 2000 NFL 11 5 0 0.688 0.375 x
NFL 2001 NFL 11 5 0 0.688 0 x
NFL 2002 NFL 12 4 0 0.75 0.062 x
NFL 2003 NFL 12 4 0 0.75 0 x
NFL 2004 NFL 13 3 0 0.812 0.062 x
NFL 2005 NFL 6 10 0 0.375 -0.437
NFL 2006 NFL 10 6 0 0.625 0.25
NFL 2007 NFL 8 8 0 0.5 -0.125
NFL 1995 NFL 11 5 0 0.688
NFL 1996 NFL 10 6 0 0.625 -0.063
NFL 1997 NFL 11 5 0 0.688 0.063
NFL 1998 NFL 7 9 0 0.438 -0.25
NFL 1999 NFL 6 10 0 0.375 -0.063
NFL 2000 NFL 9 7 0 0.563 0.188  
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League Year Team Wins Losses Ties Win % Win%Incr Qualify? Owner General Manager
NFL 2001 NFL 13 3 0 0.812 #REF! x
NFL 2002 NFL 10 5 1 0.656 -0.156 x
NFL 2003 NFL 6 10 0 0.375 -0.281
NFL 2004 NFL 15 1 0 0.938 0.563 x
NFL 2005 NFL 11 5 0 0.688 -0.25 x
NFL 2006 NFL 8 8 0 0.5 -0.188
NFL 2007 NFL 10 6 0 0.625 0.125
NBA 1995 NBA 39 43 0 0.476
NBA 1996 NBA 39 43 0 0.476 0
NBA 1997 NBA 34 48 0 0.415 -0.061
NBA 1998 NBA 27 55 0 0.329 -0.086
NBA 1999 NBA 27 23 0 0.54 0.211 x
NBA 2000 NBA 44 38 0 0.537 -0.003 x
NBA 2001 NBA 55 27 0 0.671 0.134 x
NBA 2002 NBA 61 21 0 0.744 0.073 x
NBA 2003 NBA 59 23 0 0.72 -0.024 x
NBA 2004 NBA 55 27 0 0.671 -0.049 x
NBA 2005 NBA 50 32 0 0.61 -0.061
NBA 2006 NBA 44 38 0 0.537 -0.073
NBA 2007 NBA 33 49 0 0.402 -0.135
NBA 1995 NBA 30 52 0 0.366
NBA 1996 NBA 30 52 0 0.366 0
NBA 1997 NBA 26 56 0 0.317 -0.049
NBA 1998 NBA 43 39 0 0.524 0.207
NBA 1999 NBA 16 34 0 0.32 -0.204
NBA 2000 NBA 31 51 0 0.378 0.058
NBA 2001 NBA 26 56 0 0.317 -0.061
NBA 2002 NBA 52 30 0 0.61 0.293 x
NBA 2003 NBA 49 33 0 0.598 -0.012 x
NBA 2004 NBA 47 35 0 0.573 -0.025 x
NBA 2005 NBA 42 40 0 0.512 -0.061
NBA 2006 NBA 49 33 0 0.598 0.086
 
League Year Team Wins Losses Ties Win % Win%Incr Qualify? Owner General Manager
NBA 2007 NBA 41 41 0 0.5 #REF!
MLB 1995 MLB 78 67 0 0.538
MLB 1996 MLB 70 91 0 0.435 -0.103
MLB 1997 MLB 84 78 0 0.519 0.084
MLB 1998 MLB 85 77 0 0.525 0.006
MLB 1999 MLB 70 92 0 0.432 -0.093
MLB 2000 MLB 82 80 0 0.506 0.074
MLB 2001 MLB 75 87 0 0.463 -0.043
MLB 2002 MLB 99 63 0 0.611 0.148 x
MLB 2003 MLB 77 85 0 0.475 -0.136 x
MLB 2004 MLB 92 70 0 0.568 0.093 x
MLB 2005 MLB 95 67 0 0.586 0.018 x
MLB 2006 MLB 89 73 0 0.549 -0.037 x
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Kanter’s (2004) three cornerstone’s of success 
(collaboration, initiative, accountability) 
 
3, 4, 6, 7 
 
Schein (1990) Unfreeze, Change, Freeze 
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Symptoms of a Dysfunctional 
Culture  
• Negative Environment (5) 
o Poor Facilities (3) 
o Devalue Players (2) 
o Selfish (3) 
o Bad Attitude (3) 
o Bad Leader (2) 
• Losing Habit (5) 
o Mediocrity (3) 
o No talent (3) 
o Poor Effort (2) 
o Low fan base (2) 
My Way 
• Vision (6) 
o Planning (6) 
o Vision Win (4) 
• My Values (6) 
• Change Personnel (5) 
o Best People (5) 
o Ceiling (2) 
o Take Risks (4) 
• Grow People (4) 
o Empower (4) 
• Explicit Communication (6) 
o Honest to players (4) 
o Coach Extension (3) 
 
Walk the Talk (6) 
• Day to Day (3) 
• Obstacles to Change (5) 
 Media Pressure (4) 
o Repetition (4) 
• Critical Events (5) 
• Artifact Impact (6) 
Embedding New Culture(5) 
• Turning Point (5) 
• New Success (6) 
o Buy-In (4) 
o Confidence (3) 
o Engrained Philosophy (3) 
Our Way (5) 
• Our values  
o Players (5) 
o People (6) 
o Fans (2) 
 Fan connections (5) 
 Fan Needs (3) 
o Leadership (5) 
• Better Decisions (5) 
• Independent Thought (4) 
o Not about money (3) 
o Adaptable (3) 
o Open to change (3) Figure 1. Culture Change Cycle 
 
























Brief Participant Biography 




Dan Rooney was born on January 20, 1932. Although Dan never played 
professional football, he has been involved with the game at the professional level 
throughout his life, as his father owned the Pittsburgh Steelers.  Dan first became 
president of the Steelers’ organization in 1975 and maintained that position until 2003, 
when he gave day-to-day operations to his son, Art.   
The Steelers qualified to be in this study in 2001. In the three seasons prior to 
their turn around, the Steelers accrued at 22-26 record. Since the turnaround, the Steelers 
have earned a 73-38 record, and appeared in five of the seven playoffs, along with one 
AFC Championship and one Super Bowl Championship.  
Rooney has been one of the most active owners in the NFL. He has served on 
numerous committees, and has an unmatched historical perspective of the league and the 
challenges that it has overcome.  
 
Bill Stoneman 
Bill Stoneman, born on April 7, 1944, had a successful Major League career from 
1967-1974 with the Cubs, Angels and Expos. Career highlights include two no-hitters 
while with the Expos. After his career was cut short by injuries, Mr. Stoneman spent a 
decade as a financial analyst in Canada. Convinced by Montreal Expos ownership to 
return to the game, Stoneman left Montreal and took the general manager position with 
the Los Angeles Angels. While there, Stoneman hired Mike Scioscia and built  the 2002 
World Series team, while transforming the Angels into a sustained winner. 
The Angels turnaround occurred in 2002. In the three years prior, the Angels had 
a 227-259 win-loss record. In the ten years prior to arriving, the Angels held a 734-821 
win loss record. In the five years following the turnaround, the Angels have 452-358 
record, and have been in the playoffs three times with three league championships and 
one World Series title.  
 
Geoff Petrie 
Geoff Petrie was born April 17, 1948. After graduating from Princeton, Petrie was 
drafted by the Portland Trail Blazers and played in the NBA from 1970-1976. When his 
playing career ended, Petrie held both coaching and general management positions with 
the Blazers. When the Sacramento general manager position opened in 1995, Petrie 
moved South and began rebuilding the Sacramento Kings into a perennial contender. 
The Sacramento Kings turnaround occurred in 1999. In the three years prior to the 
turnaround, the Kings were a pedestrian 127-146. In the ten years prior, the Kings were 
an awful 323-524, one of the worst records in the NBA.  In the season prior to the 
turnaround, the Kings were 27-55. In the nine seasons since, the Kings are 428-278, and 
have been in the playoffs eight times. Petrie has been awarded the NBA Executive of the 
Year twice for his work (1998-99, 2000-2001), and is currently in the midst of another 
rebuilding project with the Kings. 
 
Rod Thorn 
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Born May 23, 1941, Rod Thorn left West Virginia University early after being 
drafted by the Washington Bullets in 1963. His professional career lasted until 1971 and 
had stops in St. Louis, Detroit and Seattle.  Thorn was briefly involved as an assistant 
coach for both the NBA and the ABA prior to taking the general manager position with 
the Chicago Bulls. In his final season with the Bulls, Thorn drafted Michael Jordan out of 
North Carolina which propelled the Bulls into an era of dominance seldom seen in the 
NBA.  
After working at league headquarters for over a decade, Thorn took the General 
Manager position in New Jersey in 2000. The Nets turnaround came in 2002 shortly after 
Thorn’s arrival. In the three years prior to the turnaround, the Nets accrued a 73-141 
record. In the ten years prior, the Nets were 330-458. In 2001, the Nets were 26-56. 
Thorn made a series of moves, including trading Stephon Marbury for Jason Kidd and 
drafting Kenyon Martin with the first pick in the 2001 draft. In the six seasons since their 
turnaround, the Nets are 280-212 and have been in the playoffs all six seasons. They have 
earned two Eastern Conference Championships and appeared in the NBA Finals twice, 
falling short in their ultimate goal to superior Western Conference teams. Thorn earned 
the NBA Executive of the Year title in 2001-2002.  
 
Bill Polian 
At 66, Bill Polian is regarded as one of the premier General Managers in the NFL. 
Polian orchestrated the Bills famous run to four consecutive Super Bowls prior to taking 
a position with the Carolina Panthers in 1995, then a first year expansion franchise. 
Polian built the Panthers into the most successful expansion franchise in the history of the 
NFL, as the team played for the NFC Championship during their second season. In 1997, 
Polian decided to leave the Panthers and join the Indianapolis Colts.  
The Colts turnaround occurred in 1999. In the three years prior to the shift, the 
Colts were 15-33. Even worse, in the ten years prior to the shift, the Colts were 61-99. 
Since 1999, the Colts have accrued a 102-42 record, and have consistently been in the 
hunt for a Super Bowl. In eight of the nine seasons, the Colts have been in the playoffs. 
They have appeared in the AFC Championship game twice; after their victory over the 
Patriots in 2007, they went on to win Super Bowl XLI.  
Polian has won the NFL Executive of the Year five times (1988, 1991, 1995, 
1996, 1999). He is known for choosing Peyton Manning over Ryan Leaf in the 1998 
draft, hired Tony Dungy, and is currently a member of the NFL Competition Committee.   
 
Jeffrey Lurie 
Jeffrey Lurie, born in 1951, purchased the Philadelphia Eagles in 1994 for $195 
million. The Eagles are now estimated to be worth over $1 billion. Prior to his entry into 
the NFL, Lurie owned a Hollywood production company called Chestnut Hill 
Productions.  
The Eagles turnaround came in 2000. In the three years prior to the shift, the 
Eagles were 14-33, and it was not uncommon to see Eagles fans with paper bags over 
their heads. In the ten years prior to the shift, the Eagles were just over .500 at 80-73.  In 
the eight seasons since 2000, the Eagles are 83-45, and have represented Philadelphia in 
the playoffs six times. They have one NFC Championship in that time, and one Super 
Bowl appearance.  
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Lurie has his PhD in Social Policy from Brandeis University. Prior to his life in 
Hollywood, Lurie was an adjunct professor at Boston University. He was voted NFL 
Owner of the Year in 1995.  
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Script for Study 
 
Good morning/afternoon/evening, thank you for participating in this research study.  The 
purpose of the study is to determine how executives in professional sport have 
successfully brought their franchises through culture change.  I would like to audiotape 
this interview in order to accurately represent what you say; may I have your permission 
to tape this interview?  Before we begin I want to make sure you understand the 
following: 
 
• Because of these questions, and the high-profile nature of professional sport, your 
name may be disclosed. 
• Your participation is entirely voluntary, you can choose to stop the interview at any 
time and you do not have to answer every question. 
 
Thank you again for your willingness to participate in this study. 
 
1. Tell me about your background. How did you get to where you are now? 
2. Describe the values in this organization when you arrived? 
a. How did people treat one another? 
b. What was the organizations relationship with the fans? 
c. What was the organizations relationship with the players? 
3. How was the culture affecting performance? 
4. How did you communicate that change was necessary? 
5. What were other [organizational decision-makers] perceptions of the changes that 
needed to be made 
6. Looking back over the early phase of your tenure in this position, what would you 
describe as the critical events that required you to demonstrate your leadership 
and your values? How did you deal with these events?   
7. What was your vision for this organization?  
8. How did you communicate that vision to others? 




9. Can you describe some early successes that you believe were able to persuade the 
rest of the organization that your vision was realistic? 
10. How are your values now reflected in this organization? 
11. Can you point to any specific physical changes/documents that can be attributed 
to you? 




























Cover Letter to Participants  
 






Dear Participant,                                  
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. The purpose of this research is to 
gather information about leadership and organizational culture change in professional 
sport.  I am conducting this research as a final requirement to achieve my PhD in Sport & 
Exercise Psychology. The interview contains questions about your experiences, as a 
leader, in implementing culture change throughout an organization. This interview will 
take approximately 1-1.5 hours to complete. Your participation is voluntary and you do 
not have to answer every question. You may also stop your participation at any time 
without penalty.  
 
As a public figure, there is no guarantee of confidentiality, as it is likely identifying 
information will be provided by you in the interview.  If you have questions about the 
study, you may contact Joe Frontiera at (304) 685-6522.  For information about your 
rights as a research subject, you may call the Office of Research Compliance at (304) 
293-7073.  West Virginia University’s IRB acknowledgement of this study is on file.  
 






Joe Frontiera, M.S.     Jack Watson, Ph.D 
jfrontie@mix.wvu.edu    Jack.watson@mail.wvu.edu 
Sport & Exercise Psychology Doctoral Student Associate Professor, Dissertation Chair  
 
West Virginia University 
School of Physical Education 
P.O. Box 6116 
Morgantown, WV 26506 
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Item Yes No Comments 
 
Stadium 
   
 
Practice Facility 
   
 
Locker Room 
   
 
Coach’s Offices 
   
 
Executives Offices 
   
 
Cafeteria 
   
 
Player Lounge 




   
 
Prominent Quotes 
On Display  
   
 
Quotes on Display 
   
 
Statues/Busts 
   
 
On Display 
   
 
On Display 
   
 
 
   
 
Team___________________________________ 

























Researcher’s Bias of Organizational Culture 
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At a relatively young age, I have been a part of both productive and exciting 
organizational cultures, as well as stagnant, de-motivating organizational cultures. My 
first job after college was with a mid-size technology company. There, the environment 
was invigorating. I was able to learn on a daily basis, my colleagues were consistently 
supportive, and the management continually communicated successes, new product 
launches, and they were able to foster an environment of healthy competition. We 
consistently interacted with the management at different regional and national events. It 
was obvious they valued our opinions and contributions, as our suggestions were often 
made policy. Additionally, our organization took a consultative sales approach, one in 
which we valued the needs of our customers and tried to meet those needs. If we 
couldn’t, we maintained the relationship but suggested they go in a different direction.  
 About one year into my tenure, the mid-size company I started with was bought 
by WorldCom. At the time, WorldCom had been making many acquisitions in order to 
bolster its technological capabilities and revenue stream. However, even at my level, it 
was obvious that there was a great deal of in-fighting occurring on a regular basis. 
Individuals within this conglomerate organization were striving to maintain the power 
they held in their former organizations, while at the same time trying to meet the 
expectations of unrealistic quotas and demands from upper-management. Additionally, 
WorldCom wanted its sales associates to push their products hard, regardless of the needs 
of their customers. Their sales force reflected this attitude, and it was often personally 
and professionally embarrassing to go on joint sales calls with WorldCom 
representatives. 
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 The once close office that I had started with began to disintegrate. The 
competitive, invigorating environment that we had all thrived upon would not return. 
Individuals began working fewer hours, and often were involved in less productive 
activities while in the office. The amount of “process paperwork” grew exponentially. 
The sense of control that we had once felt about our own destiny within the organization 
was gone. I, along with others, felt powerless. My opinion was not valued, and my 
contributions were not recognized. We continually heard how well our new organization 
was doing, but these accomplishments rang false, so we assumed the success was coming 
from other areas of this $30 billion dollar company. Rarely did we see or hear from 
management. Instead, we heard horror stories from those who were forced to deal with 
management. Where our motivation was once competition, it was now fear.  
 Only after I departed did I learn that WorldCom was under investigation by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In 2002, the company was forced to declare 
bankruptcy – the largest filing in the history of the US. Both the founder and CFO were 
convicted of securities fraud and conspiracy, among other charges.  
 The contrasts of these two cultures helped shape my view of both positive and 
negative cultures. A positive culture is one which all contributors’ opinions are valued; 
employees feel empowered to share their ideas; employees are consistently learning and 
developing; and there is cross-communication throughout levels and divisions of the 
organization. A negative culture is one in which only a minority feel empowered; 
employees count the hours of the day until its time to punch out; communication is top-
down; and employees rarely take initiative or go above the standard call of duty as they 
know the risks far outweigh the benefits.  
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 These are my own biases, and it is critical for me to remain cognizant of these 
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Artifact Frequency Analysis 
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Artifact Frequency Analysis 
 


































































































































































































       
* Indicates facility built since 2000 
 ** Indicates plans to build new facility 
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Specific Links to the Culture Change Cycle Model 
 
Team 1 
Artifact Notes SDC MW WTT ENC OW 
Locker Room Improved lighting, new carpet   x x x 
Stadium Repainted rocks for left-handed hitters   x  x 
Quotes  Framed newspapers from recent seasons    x x 
On Display Wall of Fame – mostly recent players    x x 
 
Team 2 
Artifact Notes SDC MW WTT ENC OW 
Prac. facility Two full courts, jersey of past greats   x   
Prac. facility Separate media area     x 
Player lounge Pool table, video games, tv   x  x 
Rehab Steam room, spa, rehab pool   x  x 
Quotes “It’s not about you”,  “Thank Him”   x  x 
 
Team 3 
Artifact Notes SDC MW WTT ENC OW 
Prac. Facility Indoor field, two outdoor fields, 2002   x x  
Locker Room Moonroof, natural light, ground floor   x x x 
Cafeteria Middle of building, open communication   x x x 
Quotes Rosa Parks, MLK, J. Salk   x  x 
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Team 4 
Artifact Notes SDC MW WTT ENC OW 
Exec Offices 
Display 
Perseverance poster  x    
Prac. facility New, no stairs, huge banner   x  x 
Locker room No media access, new ice baths,      x 
Cafeteria Serve breakfast/lunch to players, family   x  x 
New construct Extend executive and coaching offices, 
something new every year 
    x 
On display Pro-Bowl hall: All pro-bowl players in 
history 
  x x x 
Player lounge Super Bowl pics, leather chairs, foozball   x  x 
 
Team 5 
Artifact Notes SDC MW WTT ENC OW 
Pract Facility Well lit, banners, EC Champs     x 
On display Eastern conference champs     x 
Cafeteria Breakfast and lunch orders taken by cook     x 
On display NJ Nets “Plan to Win”   x x x 
Quotes Ali quote “run on the long road”     x 
Quotes “winning about effort” V. Carter   x   
 
Team 6 
Artifact Notes SDC MW WTT ENC OW 
Prac. Facility New indoor, outdoor facility   x  x 
Statues Joe Greene – past great     x 
Cafeteria Simple, clean, small     x 
Exec Offices Lots of open spaces to promote comm.     x 
Trophies Five Lombardi Trophies – prominent 
placement 
    x 
On display Hall of Fame wall – all players through 
Steeler’s history that have made HOF 
    x 
 












Review of Literature 
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Organizational culture is a relatively abstract concept that has yet to be examined 
in the context of sport. The purpose of this review of literature is to give the reader a 
primer on the many different aspects of organizational culture. The construct will not 
only be defined, but the different methods of assessing organizational culture will be 
discussed. Furthermore, the impact of leadership on organizational culture will be 
examined, and the relationship between culture and performance will be explored. The 
literature has been consistent on the existence of a relationship between culture and 
performance (Kotter & Heskett, 1992; Smerek & Denison, 2007). 
It is important to understand the above elements prior to examining the reasons 
behind culture decline and, more importantly, the ways in which a “broken” culture 
might be repaired.  Throughout this process, a case will be constructed for the addition of 
organizational culture awareness and culture change into the more traditional sport 
psychology interventions.  
Organizational Culture 
The terms “culture” and “climate” are often used interchangeably, and there is 
considerable confusion within the literature about what each of these constructs describe. 
For example, McMurray (2005) stated that climate is a stable characteristic of a company 
that distinguishes it and “embodies members’ collective perceptions about their 
organization with respect to autonomy, trust, cohesiveness, support, recognition, 
innovation and fairness” (p. 1). Unlike McMurray, Falcione and Kaplan (1984) posited 
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that culture persists over time, while climate is a snapshot of the same elements at any 
given moment in time.  Climate is also thought to be quantifiable (measurable) while 
culture is more qualitative.   
Denison (1996) argued that culture and climate simply represent different 
perspectives of organizational environments, and that they may not be truly different 
concepts. For example, culture requires an emic perspective while climate requires an etic 
perspective; culture requires qualitative analysis while climate requires quantitative 
analysis;  culture is underlying values and assumptions while climate is the surface 
manifestations of those values and assumptions; and, culture is rich and dependent upon 
an organization’s history, while climate is ahistorical in nature. Similar to Denison’s 
perspective, and for the purpose of clarity within this literature review, the differences 
between culture and climate lie with individual perception (Ashworth, 1985). Both 
climate and culture reside on the same continuum; members are consciously aware of 
climate, while culture is a phenomenon of unconscious beliefs.  
In sport, organizational culture has not yet been examined. However, a similar 
concept has - climate. Ames (1992) defined climate as the environment that a coach 
creates within his or her team. Ames suggested that there are primarily two types of 
climates: mastery or ego-involving. A mastery climate is one in which a coach defines 
success as giving maximum effort, consistent skill improvement, and persisting through 
adversity. In contrast, an ego involving climate is one in which athletes are encouraged to 
compare themselves to one another, mistakes are punished, and winning is the primary 
emphasis.  
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 Ames’ (1992) definition of climate is markedly different than Schein’s construct 
of organizational culture, ostensibly due to the fact that Ames has studied climate only in 
the context of the sport team. However, there are additional reasons for the differences. 
For example, whether a coach creates a mastery or ego-involved climate primarily affects 
the focus of the players. In contrast, organizational culture is more subtle and pervasive, 
and impacts all members of an organization, regardless of job task or level. Secondly, 
climate is learned primarily through dealing with an individual – the coach. 
Organizational culture can be learned through the observance of how any member of an 
organization deals with issues of external adaptation or internal integration.  Finally, an 
outsider would likely be able to determine what type of climate an athletic team has by 
watching a single practice. Organizational culture is more subtle. Only a very perceptive 
outsider would be able to determine the complexities of the values and underlying 
assumptions that comprise an organization’s culture, and this would be a difficult task to 
accomplish in a single day.   
Smith and Smoll (1997) used Ames approach to climate to create Coach 
Effectiveness Training (CET), a system to assist coaches increase awareness of their own 
specific behaviors that lead to a mastery climate.  These behaviors include reframing 
“winning”, positive reinforcement, the establishment of norms which encourage athletes 
to help and support one another, and involving athletes in decisions regarding team rules. 
In one study, 31 little league baseball coaches were randomly assigned to either the 
experimental group (received CET training) or the control group (no training). Results 
indicated that CET trained coaches gave more reinforcement for effort, responded to 
mistakes with encouragement, were better liked, and were rated as better teachers. More 
Organizational Culture Change in Sport 72 
importantly, players had a significantly higher self esteem and lower dropout rate (5%) 
than those in the control group (26%). 
Despite a thorough review of literature and evidence of the positive impact of 
specific interventions on sport climate, there is a dearth of published literature examining 
organizational culture and sport. Lee, Wagstaff, Fletcher, and Hanton (2007) encouraged 
the convergence of mainstream business literature and sport psychology literature. One of 
the ten business dimensions Lee et al identified that needs to be explored in sport was 
organizational culture. Lee and colleagues implied that discrepancies within an overall 
culture might impose unnecessary demands on the athletes and therefore impact 
performance.   
While climate has been discussed in the context of sport, and culture has been 
compared to climate, it is critical to clearly define organizational culture. Most sport 
psychology consultants likely have only a vague idea of organizational culture of the 
teams, departments and organizations they work for, as training in this area is not a part 
of the traditional educational curriculum for sport psychology.  
Organizational culture came into vogue in the early 1980s to explain the failures 
of US companies relative to their Japanese counterparts (Schein, 1990). Perhaps the most 
well-known scholar of organizational culture is Edgar Schein. Schein admits that culture 
is a difficult construct to define, as it has its roots in sociology, anthropology, and 
organizational behavior (Schein, 1992). Similar to Ashworth (1985), Schein claims that 
climate is a “surface manifestation” of culture, which is defined as: 
a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved 
its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has 
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worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught 
to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in 
relation to these problems. (p. 12)  
Schein (1990, 1992) identified three different levels of culture: observable 
artifacts, values, and basic underlying assumptions. As the term implies, observable 
artifacts are aspects of an organization that any outsider would easily be able to see. For 
example, dress code, the manner in which individuals address one another (formally, 
informally, etc.), and publicized mission statements are all considered observable 
artifacts.  The second level of culture, the shared values of an organization, is not as 
easily observed. These need to be determined through interviews. For example, if 
integrity is valued within a sales organization, multiple interviews would reveal this 
through employees stated interactions with customers and co-workers. Interviews would 
reveal that the employee finds it important to keep his/her word on deliverables to 
customers.  However, if money/status is the value, this likewise would be revealed 
through interviews with subtle clues, including the lack of respect for another sales 
person’s territory.  
The third and perhaps most difficult level of culture to determine is the basic 
underlying assumptions of an organization. These are typically unconscious and can only 
be discerned through intense observations and in-depth questions (Schein, 1990). 
Continuing with the examples above, if integrity is the value, an underlying assumption 
may be that honesty leads to success, or that true success does not exist without honesty 
within human interactions. Likewise, if money/status is the value, the underlying 
assumption may be that competitive aggressiveness will drive individuals and the 
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company to be as successful as they possibly can. Those that are not competitive and/or 
aggressive will weaken the organization. 
Research has indicated that culture has an impact on organizational performance 
(Kotter & Heskett, 1992), employee behavior (Kilman, Saxton & Serpa, 1985), cohesion 
(Gagliardi, 1986), employee turnover (Sheridan, 1992), job satisfaction (Lok & 
Crawford, 2003) and self-esteem (Dutton, Dukerich & Harquail, 1994). However, culture 
can also impact communication barriers and power struggles (Kanter, 1983) and 
resistance to change (Gagliardi, 1986).  
Assessment of Culture 
Schein (1990) pointed out that because of the largely unconscious nature of 
culture, it is difficult to measure. The difficulty arises primarily because survey research 
assumes knowledge of the correct dimensions, and is therefore largely inadequate as a 
means of “measuring” culture.  Additionally, analytical-descriptive research fragments 
the holistic concept of culture; ethnographic and historical research is time consuming 
and expensive; clinical descriptive (data gathered while a consultant is helping the 
system) leaves out the breadth. Schein states that the best way to determine an 
organization’s culture is through determining what layer is most prominent, conducting 
interviews to determine values while looking for anomalies, and pushing past those 
values to determine underlying assumptions. This process is most effective when the 
interviewer has a combination of insider knowledge and outsider perspective. 
However, all researchers do not agree that culture should not be assessed 
quantitatively. Colyer (2000) compared the different cultures of five Australian sport 
associations, using the Quinn Instrument II (Quinn & Spreitzer, 1991) as the quantitative 
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measure.  The Quinn Instrument II uses the Competing Values Framework (CVF) as its 
theoretical basis. The CVF was developed in the early 80s, from an integration of theories 
and factors that were thought to contribute to organizational effectiveness. The CVF 
posits that most organizations can be assessed along two dimensions, each representing 
competing methods to solving basic challenges that all organizations must overcome in 
order to function. 
The first dimension, or set of competing values, is an organization’s penchant for 
encouraging centralized control over organizational processes, versus an organization’s 
proclivity to value decentralization and flexibility. The second dimension is the 
organization’s orientation towards its internal environment and processes versus its 
orientation towards its external environment and relationships with outsiders. 
To fully understand Colyer’s (2000) research, it is important to comprehend the 
the four resultant quadrants of the CVF.  Helfrich, Li, Mohr, Meterko, and Sales (2007), 
describe these quadrants as: 
1. Bureaucratic culture (Internal focus, emphasis on control). These organizations 
adopt centralized authority over organizational processes, have respect for a 
formal hierarchy, and adhere to rules. Stability and predictability are valued. 
2. Team cultures (Internal focus, emphasis on flexibility): These organizations 
encourage broad participation, teamwork and empowerment, and value human 
resource development. 
3. Entrepreneurial culture (External focus, emphasis on flexibility) These 
organizations foster creativity and innovativeness and place a premium on growth 
and expansion. 
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4. Rational culture (External focus, emphasis on control): These types of 
organizations are characterized by clarity of tasks and goals, with an emphasis on 
efficiency and measurable outcomes. 
These four cultures are prototypes, and organizations tend to have elements of each as 
part of their overall culture. Each culture type is assessed by four questions using a 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 to 5. A graphical representation of the culture can be 
created by placing the score for each culture type on a diagonal axis and connecting the 
four resultant points, creating an object of varying size and shape. A larger object 
indicates a stronger overall culture. 
Due to a small response rate, Colyer (2000) was able to compare only three of the 
five sport organizations’ cultures. For the four scales, Cronbach’s alpha were as follows: 
team (.88), developmental (.86), bureaucratic (.58), rational (.85). The author suggests 
that the CVF may be a good diagnostic tool to use along with qualitative methods to 
assess culture. 
Although Colyer (2000) found the use of the CVF adequate, Helfrich et al. (2007) 
utilized factor analysis to assess whether the instrument was valid in the health care 
industry. Analysis revealed a better fit for a two-factor model (parsimony) rather than the 
classic four-factor CVF. The entrepreneurial, rational and team scales combined to form 
one scale. Since their sample was non managers (N=77,776), their study raises questions 
about the CVF’s usefulness in health care and amongst non managers. 
The above analysis of the CVF indicates, as Schein (1990, 1992) suggested, that 
when culture is assessed quantitatively assumed values may not accurately measure the 
values that an organization deems important. The CVF inherently limits the types of 
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cultures and values that an organization might embrace.  Furthermore, a quantitative 
assessment does not necessarily capture the underlying assumptions of the organization. 
Although use of the Quinn Instrument II may provide an adequate starting point for 
cultural diagnosis, in isolation it limits the potential depth of cultural analysis.  
Organizational Culture Formation: The Impact of Leadership 
With a working knowledge of organizational culture and its assessment, it is 
important to explore how culture initially forms and is passed from generation to 
generation.  Schein (1983) posits that culture is a combination of the assumptions and 
theories of the founder, along with what the organization learns from its own unique 
experiences.  Accordingly, there are five seemingly philosophical tenets from which a 
culture paradigm is formed.  
The first is the organization’s relationship to its environment (dominance, 
submission, harmonizing, a niche, etc). The second tenet is the nature of truth within that 
organization. This is determined through answering the question, “how is truth ultimately 
determined?” The third tenet is the qualities of human nature within the organization. To 
determine human nature, it is important to understand what it means to be human, and 
what attributes are valued (aggressiveness, harmony, organization, creativity). The fourth 
tenet is the nature of human activity which evolves from an organization’s collective 
belief in what the right thing is for human beings to do. This is determined by the 
assumptions of reality, the environment, and human nature. For example, the nature of 
“human activity” is going to be markedly different within a non-profit organization than a 
highly competitive sales organization. The final tenet revolves around the nature of 
human relationships.  This is dictated by an organization’s belief of the “right way” for 
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people to interact with each other. To best understand this, it is important to assess how 
power and love are distributed, and whether life is collaborative or competitive, based on 
laws and regulation or on charisma.   
These tenets are developed through what leaders role model, what they pay 
attention to, and how they react to critical events. Schein (1990, 1992) believes that 
culture is created around critical incidents. Specifically, the immediate next set of 
behaviors after an incident begins to create a norm, through identification with leaders. 
Additional methods in which a culture can be reinforced are through organizational 
design, systems and procedures, physical layout and design, the stories, myths and 
legends that are emphasized, and formal statements of organizational philosophies, such 
as mission or vision statements (Schein, 1990). 
Although Schein was convinced that leadership influenced culture, Sarros, Gray 
and Densten (2002) attempted to determine the causal factor in the leadership-culture 
relationship. They administered the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ Form 
5x; Bass & Avolio, 1997) and the Organizational Culture Profile (OCP; O’Reilly, 
Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991) to 1918 executives in Australia. The MLQ measures 
elements of transactional and transformational leadership, such as idealized attributes, 
idealized behaviors, inspirational motivation, and intellectual stimulation. The OCP 
measures organizational culture orientations along eight factors, including innovation, 
attention to detail, outcome orientation, aggressiveness, supportiveness, emphasis on 
rewards, team orientation, and decisiveness.  
Multiple regression analysis was used to determine if the above aspects of 
leadership predicted the different elements of organizational culture, or whether aspects 
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of culture influenced leadership.  The authors found that different elements of leadership 
had a moderate impact on culture, with a variance ranging from 14%-24%. Conversely, 
culture had less of an impact on leadership, with the variance of 4%-10%.  
When examining these findings in more detail, Sras and his fellow researchers 
found that a transactional leadership style accounted for 24% of the variance of cultural 
aspect of emphasis on rewards (i.e., fair behavior which rewards and praises good work 
performance, and provides opportunities for professional growth); the leadership quality 
of supportiveness accounted for 23% of the variance of the cultural aspect of inspirational 
motivation; the leadership quality of innovation accounted for 20% of the variance of the 
cultural aspect of both inspirational motivation and contingent reward; and the leadership 
style of competitiveness accounted for 18% of the variance of the cultural aspect of 
inspirational motivation and contingent rewards.  
In summary, Sarros and his colleagues’ work largely supported the supposition of 
Schein – that leadership leads to culture. However, their findings cannot be interpreted in 
a dichotomous manner, as they also suggested that culture has an impact on leadership. 
Additionally, the culture that leaders help to form is reinforced by the experience of the 
organization and whether the leader’s way has been effective in the organization’s ability 
to deal with crisis (Schein, 1983).  For a successful first generation organization, one of 
the main dilemmas is how to successfully transition the culture in a way that preserves it 
and at the same time ensures that the organization remains adaptive to its always-
changing external environments. This conscious dilemma implicitly implies that the 
initial culture of an organization positively impacts the organization’s performance. 
Culture and Performance 
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This implicit implication of a definitive relationship between culture and 
performance has been debated by scholars of organizational culture.  Kotter and Heskett 
(1992), widely seen as the preeminent experts on the relationship between culture and 
performance, have made a compelling case that culture does impact performance. They 
outline three general theories of culture: the strong culture, the strategically appropriate 
cultures, and the adaptive culture.   
Over the span of four years, Kotter and Heskett (1992) analyzed performance 
metrics for hundreds of organizations.  First, they classified each organization into one of 
three culture types. The first of these, the strong culture, is one in which the organization 
has an evident, notable style. In other words, employees are aligned and motivated to do 
their jobs in a specific manner.  These cultures are easily identifiable to the outside world, 
as evidenced by the “IBM Way” in business, or the New York Yankees in sport where 
athletes must adhere to a strict dress code and carry themselves professionally on and off 
the field. To test the relationship between strong cultures and performance, Kotter and 
Heskett (1992) administered culture strength indices and examined economic 
performance measures for 207 organizations from a wide variety of industries and 
locations.  They found that there was a general positive correlation between strength of 
corporate culture and market value (r = .26), net income growth (r = .46), and return on 
average investment (r=.31).  However, these correlations were relatively weak and lacked 
consistency. For example, it is possible to have a strong culture with bad performance, so 
a strong culture may include “dysfunctional elements” that may be a detriment to 
performance. In fact, most of the organizations that had a strong culture but weak 
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performance often had a prior history of success, indicating that the organization held 
onto a culture past the time of its effectiveness.  
The second culture type that was examined was the strategically appropriate culture, 
or a culture that is effective only if it fits within its current internal and external 
environment. For example, a culture with slow decision making and a lot of bureaucracy 
would not be an appropriate fit for a dot com company in the Silicon Valley, where 
change occurs rapidly. Only a culture strategically appropriate, or one that fits within its 
current external environment, will facilitate a strong performance. Kotter and Heskett 
(1992) selected 22 of the original 207 companies from 10 different industries, each of 
which had outperformed the overall industry. Each sample company was matched with a 
company that underperformed as compared with its industry.  
The researchers then took a qualitative approach and interviewed members of all 
organizations, questioning whether they thought their culture helped performance, hurt 
performance, both helped and hurt it, had no impact on performance, and whether their 
respective culture fit the market.  To add further depth to their data, they had participants 
answer the same questions using a Likert-type scale. Overwhelmingly, those in 
companies that had lower performance felt that their company’s culture hurt their 
performance and did not fit their industry, while those in higher performing organizations 
felt their culture helped their performance and was a good fit for their industry. The main 
criticism of this theory is that external environments change, and often the culture of a 
company remains the same. When the culture-environment discrepancy grows, 
performance may suffer. 
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The final culture theory type examined was the adaptive culture.  The adaptive 
culture takes into account environmental change. This type of culture helps members 
anticipate and adapt to environmental change; the only cultures that will perform well are 
those that continually and successfully adapt. As cited in Kotter and Heskett (1992), 
Kilmann, Saxton and Serpa (1985) described and adaptive culture as one that: 
entails a risk-taking, trusting, and proactive approach to organizational as 
well as individual life. Members actively support one another’s efforts to 
identify all problems and implement workable solutions. There is a shared 
feeling of confidence: the members believe, without a doubt, that they can 
effectively manage whatever new problems and opportunities will come 
their way. There is a widespread enthusiasm, a spirit of doing whatever it 
takes to achieve organizational success. The embers are receptive to 
change and innovation. (p. 44)  
This change-embracing culture must come from leadership, and the adaptive culture 
must value leadership (Kotter, 1990). The leadership, in turn, must value the core 
constituencies of the organization: customers, stockholders and employees. The adaptive 
cultures theory states that the higher performing organizations values all three of the 
constituents. Because the managers care deeply about the constituencies, they pay close 
attention to them, their needs, and the environment. When changes amongst or within 
constituents occur, managers are quick to spot the trend and make the appropriate 
changes to align their strategy with the new conditions.  
Using the same 22 organizations from the study above, Kotter and Heskett (1992) 
asked the question “how much does the culture value excellent leadership from its 
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managers?” using a Likert-scale from 1 (low) to 7 (high). Higher performing firms 
averaged 6, while lower performing firms averaged 3.9. Furthermore, higher performing 
firms valued their customers (Mhigher = 6.0; Mlower = 4.6), employees (Mhigher = 5.8; Mlower 
= 4.1) and stockholders (Mhigher = 5.7; Mlower = 3.9) significantly more than the lower 
performing firms. 
In summary, this information implies that there is lack of leadership directing an 
organization’s focus on salient issues in lower performing organizations. Additionally, 
this also may indicate that employees within these organizations who may be focused on 
salient issues (customers, employees, stockholders) may feel that their actions will fail to 
make a difference. More importantly, this information indicates that there is a positive 
relationship between organizations that focus outwardly on customers and stockholders 
and internally on employees and leadership.  
Because each of the above studies is correlational in nature, it is difficult to say 
that culture causes performance, or performance causes culture. Yet, through their 
qualitative analysis, Kotter and Heskett (1992) make a strong case that a pattern of 
success emerges when managers care about their constituencies, pay attention to them, 
and quickly recognize when changes are occurring at those levels. They then use 
leadership, which is highly valued, to drive changes (reduce costs, improve products, 
culture modification) until they again have adapted to their environments. 
By applying Kotter and Heskett’s concept of culture to professional sport 
organizations, it is easy to identify franchises that neatly fit in the mold of each of the 
three cultures. For example, the Oakland Raiders (2008) have a strong culture that 
mirrors the identity of its owner, Al Davis. He has always been a maverick, often suing 
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the league and picking up players that other teams have deemed as “problems”. He has 
also stubbornly held on to his “long ball” philosophy, despite the major changes 
occurring in the league at large with the embracement of the West Coast offense, zone 
blitzes and salary caps.  At one time, his strategy was successful. However, he has held 
onto his philosophy, ignoring two of the three elements of his constituents: his fans 
(customers) and his players and coaches (employees). Despite the Raiders strong culture, 
the organization is largely ineffective in today’s NFL. 
In summary, there seems to be a strong link between culture and performance. In 
order to create or maintain an adaptive culture, the owner or general manager of a sport 
organization must focus on core constituents: their employees (athletes and coaches), 
their customers (fans), and their stockholders (owners).  In doing this the team has a 
greater chance of achieving success, as leadership will quickly recognize and adapt to 
changes that are occurring throughout the league within which they compete. 
When cultures go bad 
Now that culture-performance link has been established, it is necessary to explore 
why cultures go bad and the types of culture that do not facilitate successful performance. 
Singh (2006) suggests that the average lifespan of an organization has been shrinking 
steadily, and is now roughly 35 years. This lifespan is likely to shrink further in the near 
future, as changes continue to occur at a faster pace.   
Along with lifespan, there are four broad reasons why organizations eventually 
become obsolete (Singh, 2006). For one, the organization is overwhelmed by external 
changes. Often, the strategies that organizations implement become obsolete due to 
external environmental changes. Whether the change revolves around consumer 
Organizational Culture Change in Sport 85 
preference, the behavior of competitors, technology, or governmental policies, these 
changes can be major and they can occur quickly. Secondly, inertia may hold 
organizations to the formula of past success.  Third, both hubris and complacency take 
hold. Pride essentially blinds members to competitive pressures and changes to the 
external environment. Finally, once an organization realizes that a major change is 
needed, they underestimate the difficulty of implementing change. Instead, they try to 
push ideas through resistance as quickly as possible, rather than empowering employees 
and selling them on the idea that if the status quo is maintained, their organization will no 
longer be relevant. 
In her book The Change Masters, Kanter (1983) discussed organizations that were 
close to becoming obsolete. She identifies the cultures existing within these companies as 
“segmentalist”. A segmentalist culture is one in which barriers are placed, both 
intentionally and inadvertently, between the different units of an organization.  Once this 
occurs, collaboration is reduced or eliminated, and power is concentrated amongst a few 
individuals or levels. Once a segmentalist culture develops, little communication takes 
place between departments, and the prime motivator for members is securing power for 
themselves or their department.  Because of this, each unit works solely through their 
respective boss, causing “silos” to form throughout the company. 
Within these organizations, management uses control rather than empowerment to 
direct their employees. Often, elaborate bureaucratic processes develop, along with 
centralized decisions and a one-way flow of communication (top-down). When 
employees are not empowered, risk-taking is eliminated as there is a general intolerance 
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of failure. This intolerance results in employees conforming to the status quo – which 
may have been successful in the past but will eventually become ineffective. 
Kanter (1983) takes the stance that it is necessary for any organization to innovate 
and change – to keep up with both internal and external market factors. Within a 
segmentalist organization, there are three factors that make innovation difficult. For one, 
it is less likely that an innovator will overcome the barriers that inherently exist within 
the organization. For example, an innovator may experience difficulty obtaining enough 
power to even present an idea.  Secondly, it is not likely that an innovation that does 
make it will be taken advantage of by the particular unit within which it was developed. 
After all, this could displace the current power structure. Finally, if an innovation does 
stick, it is unlikely that a segmentalist organization will have the internal communication 
networks to transfer the innovation throughout the company so that the entire 
organization can reap the benefits of the change.  
 In addition to inherent challenges with innovation, two traps are common within 
segmentalist organizations (Kanter, 1983). The first has been coined the “bureaucratic 
trap”.  This occurs when there is a sense of powerlessness, which generates the need to 
defend one’s territory.  Often times, this defense leads to an inherent resistance to other’s 
good ideas. The second trap, the entrepreneurial trap, is the perceived need to be the 
source of a good idea within an organization. This leads members to push their own ideas 
forward and ignore others, to the detriment of the organization.  
 Other theories abound about dysfunctional cultures. In the popular trade book, 
The Five Dysfunctions of Team, Lencioni (2002) develops a model in which each of five 
dysfunctions builds upon one another until you have a thoroughly dysfunctional 
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organization. The first dysfunction is an absence of trust, or an unwillingness to be open 
with team members. Once this occurs, the second dysfunction, a fear of conflict, 
develops.  When conflict is absent, it becomes difficult to commit to an idea because few 
have voiced their opinions, regardless of whether the opinions are filled with dissent or 
agreement. The fourth dysfunction that naturally follows is an avoidance of 
accountability. After all, if you do not fully commit to an idea, it is difficult to hold 
yourself or your peers accountable. And finally, when there is little accountability, the 
result is an inattention to results, which Lencioni claims occurs when team members put 
individual needs and division needs above the collective needs and goals of the team.  
 Kanter’s (2004) work has supported Lencioni’s theory of team dysfunction. In her 
book about leadership, confidence and the psychology of turnarounds, she says along 
with a natural shelf life, denial can be a large virus that impacts organizations that are 
accustomed to winning. It’s easy to deny that there is a problem and that the market may 
have changed. Denial can erode what Kanter calls the three cornerstones of success: 
collaboration, initiative and accountability. This denial may stem from dysfunctional 
assumptions within the culture that “operate as silent filters of what is perceived and 
thought about” (p. 78). Further confidence erodes when employees retreat to protect their 
own “turf”, which can be considered their power, their direct reports or their own product 
line. This cycle of decline is solidified when organizations begin to encounter “doom 
loops”.  Kanter (2004) defines doom loops as: 
Decline generally does not stem from a single factor, but from an 
accumulation of decisions, actions, and commitments that become 
entangled in self-perpetuating system dynamics. Once a cycle of decline 
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is established, it is hard to simply call a halt, put on the brakes and 
reverse direction. The system has momentum. Expectations have 
formed, and they can turn into a culture that perpetuates losing. (p. 95) 
Kanter claims that when there are few resources or coping mechanisms for dealing 
with problems within an organization, employees fall back on almost primitive self-
protective behavior.  Nine common pathologies begin to unfold, as an emotional and 
behavioral chain reaction: communication decreases; criticism and blame increases; 
respect decreases; isolation increases; focus turns inward; rifts widen and inequities 
grow; initiative decreases; aspirations diminish; negativity spreads. 
Furthermore, similar to an ego oriented athlete who knows s/he can not win, an 
environment is cultivated and reinforced that discourages employees from trying to 
impact change. After all, why try to change a situation when the belief persists that there 
will be no impact? In fact, Kanter (2004) believes that “sports teams may be relatively 
simple examples, but the dynamics of losing streaks in sports illuminated issues of failure 
in more complex systems” (p. 138). 
Culture Change  
Each of the authors in the above section agreed that when a culture goes bad, 
change become necessary. These changes are often complex, difficult and take a 
significant amount of time. In fact, an entire academic field, change management, has 
evolved focusing on how to successfully create change within organizations. Although 
that field focuses on implementing changes of process or technology, altering culture is 
subtly different and places more emphasis on the human element. 
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Culture change has its roots far before the advent of organizational psychology. 
Phelan (2005) compares the eight-step process of organizational change developed by 
Kotter and Heskett (1992) to the anthropologic concept of revitalization. Kotter and 
Heskett’s model is as follows: 
1. Initial Culture: The initial culture develops, which leads to success. 
2. Aberrant behavior: New managers, not aware or in agreement with the existing 
culture, exhibit behavior that conflicts with the established cultural norms or 
vision (arrogance, lack of values, resistance to change). 
3. New Leadership, New Vision: A new CEO is hired who identifies the crisis, and 
develops a vision to lead the organization from that crisis. 
4. Reorganization: This new leader maintains a high visibility and models the new 
acceptable behavior. 
5. Successful culture change: Because the new actions achieve desired results, 
employees are motivated to change their behavior. Furthermore, norms and values 
also begin to change. 
In anthropology, the concept of cultural revitalization has many parallels. Cultural 
revitalization is a “movement that involves establishing new religious or political 
ideologies in societies that are threatened by cultural crisis” (p.49). 
1. Steady state period – the existing culture operates in an acceptable manner. 
2. Period of increased individual stress: Economic distress, epidemic, politics or war 
is a catalyst that enlightens people that the traditional manner of dealing with 
stress is no longer effective. 
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3. Period of Revitalization:  A prophet or visionary comes forth with a plan (often 
given by a supernatural being) that presents a culturally relevant goal. This plan 
includes communication, reorganization, adaptation, routinization, and finally a 
new steady state. 
It is evident that organizational cultural change is not a novel concept. It has its origins in 
the larger cultural changes that have occurred throughout our history.  Applying these 
two models to professional sport, its easy to see how an organization can have prolonged 
success followed by economic hardship, poor management, or the failure to deal with 
external changes. Once this occurs, new ownership or management comes in with a 
specific plan to make the team relevant again. A great example of this is the San 
Francisco 49ers. Throughout the 80s and early 90s, they were arguably the most 
successful team in the National Football League. Issues with their upper management and 
ownership, and arrogance from their past success, left the franchise reeling, both 
financially and from a coaching and talent standpoint. However, over the past five years, 
a new general manager and coach have introduced specific goals under a comprehensive 
plan in an attempt to make the team relevant again.  
In the early 20th century, Kurt Lewin, a physicist turned psychologist, developed a 
three-step model of change. Lewin believed that in order for successful systemic change 
to occur, it is necessary to unfreeze the current system, make the change, and refreeze the 
new system (Kent, 2001). However, most systems ignore the first and third steps. When 
these steps are ignored, the change will most likely fail. 
Schein (1990) asserts that Lewin’s three step process needs to occur in order to 
successfully change culture. First, leaders need to “unfreeze” the present system by 
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outlining and discussing impending threats to the organization if no change occurs. 
Secondly, a new direction needs to be formalized along with a new set of assumptions. 
This second step is the actual “change”. At times, it is necessary to inject outsiders into 
the system who have not been acculturated by the past system. New rituals and artifacts 
need to be created in order to emphasize the “new way”. Finally, members of the 
organization need to be positively reinforced when their actions align with the new 
assumptions, and punished when they adhere to old assumptions. In severe cases, groups 
that hold tightly to the old culture need to be disbanded. This third step is “refreezing” the 
new culture. 
Not only do organizations inadvertently skip the “unfreeze” and “refreeze” steps, 
but Kotter and Haskett (1992) assert that culture is difficult to change because both the 
interdependence between and within levels of culture (i.e., values and behaviors), and the 
interdependence between the culture and the power structure. Additionally, there is a 
strong connection between human emotions and values. There are also multiple ways in 
which a culture sustains itself and resists change. Examples of this are the stories that are 
told repeatedly within organizations to remind members of the organization’s values.  A 
second example is the selection criteria used for new members. Wallach (1983) adds that 
along with the organization, individuals applying for membership also attempt to ensure 
that there is a culture match. Therefore, both the organization and the new members work 
together to ensure that the culture remains the same.  
Gagliardi (1986) suggests that there is a relatively simple explanation for the 
strong resistance to culture change within an organization. When a culture change is 
necessary, it is usually because the values and assumptions that were once effective in 
Organizational Culture Change in Sport 92 
dealing with organizational crises are no longer effective. However, values and their 
underlying assumptions are not open for discussion or criticism. Gagliardi posits that 
there is a four stage process for ingraining these values. The first phase occurs when a 
leader shares his/her vision. Typically, this vision is a set of beliefs including a cause-
effect relationship.  If the behaviors oriented by the basic beliefs lead to the desired 
outcome, the belief is spread to all members of the organization and becomes a reference 
point (phase 2).  As the desired results continue to be achieved, the organization shifts its 
focus from the effects, which provides “evidence of the validity of its belief” (p. 122) to 
the cause, which remains prominent and becomes the ideal (phase 3).  Finally the value, 
which is now believed by all in the organization, is taken for granted and begins to orient 
behavior (phase 4).    
For example, if an owner of a new professional football team values experienced 
talent above all else, s/he will hire a GM and coaches who also value talent. The team 
will be built primarily through high-priced, established free agents. This initial team is 
successful for the first year, and proceeds to the first round of the playoffs, far exceeding 
expectations for any first year club in an established league. The value of building on 
talent spreads to others in the organization, and the team continues to build utilizing high 
priced free agents. Yet, salary cap restrictions, an aging roster, and a lack of chemistry 
eventually collude and leave the team at the bottom of the standings.  Despite 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the team continues to recruit talented free-agents, 
as experienced talent has become an unquestioned ideological value despite current 
performance indications to the contrary. 
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Fortunately, the situation outlined above is not irrevocable. Gagliardi (1986) also 
outlines three conditions for implementing culture change. First, there should be no 
antagonism between new values an organization is trying to promote and the old values 
an organization has held. Using the example above, it would be ineffective to say that 
talent no longer matters - only character and chemistry matter. That antagonizes an 
organization’s ideology. Rather, it would be more effective to ingrain the value of 
instilling the new value that “we need to develop our own talent.” The second condition 
for culture change is that the organization needs to collectively experience success in 
exercising the new values. Accordingly, the organization that shifts values to developing 
talent from within needs to experience improvements when using that strategy. Finally, 
the leadership of an organization needs to promote a “mythical” interpretation of that 
success.  
In an attempt to better understand these concepts, Smith (2003) conducted a 
survey study using 210 managers from different industries across North America. 
Roughly 28% of the respondents indicated that their organizations went through some 
type of culture change in the two years prior. Only 19% of these attempted changes were 
rated as extremely successful. Ironically success was more likely when the sponsors 
(supporters of the change) were officers other than the CEO or COO.  Successful change 
most strongly correlated with the following: the desired change was rewarded; the change 
effort was kept small; a dedicated project team was assigned; there was apparent support 
from a sponsor over the course of the project; and progress was tracked and publicized.  
Conversely, the key correlates to failed culture change include the departure of the 
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sponsor (r = - .58; p < .0005), key executives did not fully support the change (r = -.39; p 
< .0005), and that the culture did not support the change (r = -.37; p < .0005). 
Smith’s (2003) research paints a rather bleak picture of culture change, but also 
provides a salient guide to successfully implementing culture change. Kanter (2004) takes 
a more qualitative approach and examines change in “psychological” terms. Specifically, 
she examines prolonged success in business, sport, and even at the level of government to 
determine the qualities that bring about change. Kanter posits that confidence is the 
cornerstone of healthy organizations. There are three primary elements to confidence: 
accountability, collaboration, and initiative. The author defines accountability as an 
environment in which there is nothing to hide. Individuals want to share information, 
even negative information, because that could potentially strengthen the team. Individuals 
and groups constantly seek feedback and self improvement. Collaboration is defined as 
the desire to work with others. Initiative is defined as empowerment. Employees feel 
empowered and that their opinions matter. Kanter (2004) believes that winning streaks 
end when one of the three cornerstones erodes. 
To go from a losing streak to a winning streak, Kanter believes that all major 
turnarounds have multiple commonalities. For one, leaders must make a decision about a 
situation that may have previously been ignored.  In other words, all members of an 
organization must face the facts, admit responsibility for a problem, develop clear 
priorities and implement the means for clear performance feedback. “Ducking the facts 
about performance for fear of being judged, criticized, humiliated, and punished 
characterizes losing streaks, not winning streaks” (p.209). Secondly, it is necessary to 
increase collaboration. In a losing streak, individuals’ confidence in one another is low. 
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This must be restored, and this can be done through cultivating new ways to 
communicate, new topics of conversation, and jointly carrying out important work. Third, 
leaders must inspire initiative. This can be done through the empowerment of employees, 
and holding the honest belief in people and the ability to make a difference. It is 
important to note that culture change is not a goal in itself. It is a means to improve 
performance, to start “winning” again.  
As mentioned earlier, Kanter believes that sport teams may represent simple 
examples of culture change.  In her book Confidence: Leadership and the Psychology of 
Turnarounds, she outlines the transformation of the Philadelphia Eagles. This started 
with owner Jeffery Lurie, who purchased the Eagles for $185 million. At the time of his 
purchase, the Eagles had a long history of losing. Lurie catalogued the key ingredients for 
a turnaround: a superb leader/coach; a franchise quarterback; an excellent player 
personnel department; an outstanding practice facility; and a new stadium. At first, Lurie 
hired Ray Rhodes, a disciplinarian. “Disciplinarian coaches, like tough corporate bosses 
brought into tighten things up, often wear out their welcome relatively quickly and 
players begin to just tune them out” (p.152).  After Rhodes departed, Lurie hired Andy 
Reid, and the culture change continued. Together, Lurie and Reid formed a player’s 
committee, built a new practice facility with no pillars for open environment, installed a 
cafeteria in central location, orchestrated film night for families of employees and 
players, and put tributes to Martin Luther King, Mother Teresa, and Jonas Salk in the 
lobby to signify the new values of the organization which went well beyond football.  
Over the past ten years, the Eagles have been one of the most successful organizations in 
the NFL. 
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This story speaks to the importance within the field of sport psychology to have a 
working understanding of organizational culture, and the factors that influence whether a 
culture is assisting in the success of an organization or contributing to its decline.  In 
working with leadership (owners, general managers) to systematically create a culture 
that is conducive to success, a sport psychology consultant can have a much greater 
impact than if s/he worked with a limited number of athletes on that team.  
Kanter believes that leaders have a huge impact on the ability of their 
organizations to make changes, as they are the ones that have the greatest impact on 
culture. “The fundamental task of leaders is to develop confidence in advance of victory, 
in order to attract the investments that make the victory possible – money, talent, support, 
loyalty, attention, effort or people’s best thinking.” (p.19)  
Conclusion 
In an article by Chad Ford in ESPN.com evaluating the draft prospects of Yi Lang 
from China, Ford had this to say: “After seeing international players such as Yao Ming 
and Bargnani shine in a good situation and Darko Milicic suffer in a bad situation, they 
know that style of play, coaching, organizational culture and the opportunity to play will 
ultimately determine whether Yi fulfills his enormous potential” (Ford, 2007). This 
suggests that, along with some general mangers, even sportswriters understand how 
important organizational culture may be to the success of an athlete.  
This review of literature has explained the constructs of climate and 
organizational culture, discussed the challenges in assessing organizational culture, 
outlined the role that leadership plays in developing and maintaining the culture, and 
linked the constructs of culture to performance in both business (empirically) and sport 
Organizational Culture Change in Sport 97 
(analogously). Additionally, this paper has demonstrated the challenges of effectively 
changing culture once it is no longer conducive to successful performance. Most 
importantly, this review has highlighted the lack of research and information that exists 
about organizational culture in professional and collegiate sport.  There is a wealth of 
information within business literature and, arguably, professional sport organizations are 
simply businesses with a very unique product: a team.   
It would serve sport psychology consultants to examine sport organizations’ 
cultures in order to determine how an athlete’s overall environment, not simply his or her 
thought processes about that environment, may impact performance. If culture has an 
impact on enjoyment, commitment, motivation, and performance within business, surely 
the sport psychology field could benefit in learning how to impact organizational culture 
in sport.  In seeking this understanding, it makes sense to begin an initial exploration into 
organizational culture of professional athletics.  
Specifically, leaders of professional sport organizations, filling both ownership 
and general management positions, are often seen as change agents. A new owner or 
general manager often has a dramatic impact on the on-field success of the teams that 
they oversee. Kanter (2004) clearly demonstrated how an owner had a significant impact 
on the success of a professional football team. Casual sport fans around the country have 
opinions on whether their team’s owner/general manager is conducive to success, or 
rather act as a barrier to success. A contemporary example of this phenomenon is Isiah 
Thomas’ disastrous tenure as general manager/coach of the New York Knicks basketball 
team. Thomas is widely criticized for handicapping that franchise, both financially and 
from a talent standpoint, for years to come (Ford, 2008). 
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 According to Schein (1990, 1992), this cultural exploration can be accomplished 
through qualitative methods. As mentioned earlier, owners and general managers are 
often credited for improving the fortunes of sport organizations. Through the interview of 
leaders who have successfully turned their respective franchises around, different 
elements of leadership and culture can be extracted that may have helped facilitate 
success. Questions regarding the change process, artifacts, values, and the underlying 
assumptions of an organization can be asked that might enlighten some of the processes 
and substance of successful culture change. For example, it would be beneficial to 
determine the values and underlying assumptions of the organization when it was 
struggling, how the new values and assumptions differ, and the type of process was 
implemented to bring about the transition.  In clarifying the methods of successful sport 
executives, we can utilize their experience to take the first steps toward understanding, 
and eventually manipulating, organizational culture within sport organizations.  
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